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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

CARLA K. PARKER,

:

Petitioner/Appellee,
v.

•

DALE S. PARKER,
Respondent/Appellant.

:

Case No. 981362-CA

:

Priority No. 15

:

District Court No. 95-490-4494

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPELLEE#S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The

Appellee

agrees

with

Appellant's

Statement

of

Jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court abuse the broad discretion afforded it

when it bifurcated the divorce proceedings and entered a Decree
of Divorce prior to deciding the remaining property and debt
distribution issues?

II.

Did the trial court abuse the broad discretion afforded it

in determining that April 16, 1996, the date the Decree of Divorce
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was entered, was the proper date to use in valuing the marital
estate?

III. Did the trial court abuse the broad discretion afforded it
in the way it valued and distributed the Murray Parkway real
property?

IV.

Was there sufficient credible evidence to support the value

the trial court placed•on the Murray Parkway real property?

V.

Did the trial court abuse the broad discretion afforded it

in the manner in which it valued and distributed the various bank
accounts of the parties?

VI.

Has the Appellant failed in his duty to marshall the evidence

in order to demonstrate that the trial court erred in the manner
it valued and distributed the Murray Parkway property and the
various bank accounts of the parties?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appellee agrees with Appellant that there are no statutory
or constitutional provisions determinative of the issues presented
in connection with this appeal.

2
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mrs. Parker seeks the following relief in connection with
this appeal:
1.

For an order upholding the trial court's Findings and

Conclusions in all respects;
2.

For an order affirming the trial court's decision and

related orders in all respects;
3.

For an order awarding Mrs. Parker all of the attorney's

fees and costs she has *been required to incur in connection with
having to respond to Mr. Parker's appeal.
4.

For such other and further relief as this Court might

deem appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course of the
Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Appellee agrees with Appellant's statement regarding the
nature of the proceedings and disposition below. However Appellee
supplements that statement with the following information which
is pertinent to the issues presented for review.
At trial, both sides requested property debt distributions
that were

significantly

different

in terms of not only what

property each wanted to receive but also as to the value of that
property and whether or not it should be included as a part of the
marital estate.

(See Ex. P-4A included in the Addendum to this

Brief and Ex. D-10) .

In its final decision, the trial court

accepted portions of each side's respective proposals and rejected
3
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others.

(See Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law; R-815-837 included in the Addendum to this Brief).
Mrs. Parker has not filed a cross-appeal in connection with
the trial court's decision.
B.

Statement of Facts.

Mr. Parker's Statement of Facts contains many references to
the record and trial testimony which are really not relevant to
the issues which he has raised on appeal.
Statement

In addition, his

of Facts omits and fails to mention testimony and

evidence presented by Mrs. Parker which are related to the issues
on appeal and which supports and provides the basis for the trial
court's decision related to the valuation and distribution of the
parties' assets and liabilities.
Consequently, Mrs. Parker will set forth her own Statement
of Facts which will provide this Court with the evidence presented
below on which the trial court based its decision and which Mr.
Parker has neglected to mention.
Marital History
This case involved a marriage of 25 years during which Mrs.
Parker raised three children and embarked on a career in real
estate, first becoming an agent, then a broker and on occasion a
developer (TR-17) . Mr. Parker, on the other hand was not inclined
to pursue a career in those areas. Rather, he first began working
in the construction industry and then in approximately 1986 began
building homes (TR-658). He started his own construction business
known as Aspen View Homes, Inc. (TR-658)

Mrs. Parker established

4
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and operated her own real estate company consisting of Realty
Brokers

Performance;

Realty

Brokers

Service;

and

R

Brokers

Partnership (TR-17).
Because the parties' respective focuses were in different
areas,

they elected

to keep their business

and

professional

dealings separate from their personal, household dealings (TR674) .

They each maintained separate bank accounts for their

respective businesses (TR-176, 179) and any income either might
earn was first deposited into their business accounts (TR-185) and
then subsequently transferred into a family equipment leasing
account to pay each of their auto expenses (TR-182) and into a
joint account from which family expenses were paid (TR-4 08, 517,
521,

830) .

The

parties

would

also

cause

their

respective

businesses to loan monies to the other's business from time to
time (TR-20) and as would be expected in such a business setting,
those loans would ultimately be repaid (TR-20).

Mr. Parker did

not want to be involved in Mrs. Parker's real estate business (TR183) other than from time to time to use her services in locating
lots on which he could build homes and in locating potential
buyers to purchase the homes which he built.

(TR-358, 667)

Mrs. Parker testified that Mr. Parker was never involved in
her businesses and in fact did not encourage her to succeed in her
endeavors (TR-73).

She described him as a control person (TR-74).

She said he did not want to be involved in the developments she
put together other than to purchase lots so that he could build

5
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homes and earn income from the ultimate sale of the homes which
he built.

(TR-89)

Mr. Parker was never a signatory on Mrs. Parker's business
accounts. (TR-176)

He had his own business/personal account from

which he paid the expenses he incurred in acquiring lots, building
homes as well as and some of his personal expenses.

(TR-177)

Mrs. Parker was also charged with the responsibility of keeping
track of and paying all of the family bills from their joint
account

(TR 408, 830) .•

She also put together all of the tax

information so that their tax returns could be prepared and filed.
(TR-193)

Each of the parties' businesses filed separate tax

returns. (TR-395)

Mrs. Parker testified that on many occasions

the parties' tax liabilities would be paid from Mrs. Parker's
separate accounts.

(TR-397, 517)

Because of a different work ethic, Mrs. Parker testified that
over the years she was the moving force in all of the different
entities which she started and operated.
Over

time,

deteriorated.

the

marriage

(TR-444)

relationship

of

the

parties

The parties separated and Mrs. Parker filed for a

divorce in the fall of 1995. (R-l; TR-401)

At that time, she was

actively involved in her real estate business, listing, selling
and brokering properties and attempting to subdivide and develop
some undeveloped land located in Murray, Utah (the Murray Parkway
property).

She was earning commissions, securing listings and

paying related business expenses as she had historically done and
was beginning to work on developing the Murray parkway property.
6
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(TR-486)

Likewise, at the time Mr. Parker was building homes and

buying and selling lots in his business as he had historically
done.

(TR-542, 781, 838, Ex. D-16)
At about this same time Mrs. Parker learned that Mr. Parker

had become involved with one of her best friends, Ms. Tamara
Torkelson.

(TR-834)

Mr. Parker had a line of credit on the

marital residence with West One Bank. Mrs. Parker was an obligor
on that line. Mr. Parker had used it in the past to purchase lots
and pay for building expenses. At the time the divorce was filed,
there was a $71,000.00 outstanding balance against the line.
4 91)

(TR-

Mr. Parker testified that he and Ms. Torkelson were going

to use the line to fund a business venture involving the purchase
of a lot and the construction of a home.

(TR-142)

Also at that time, Mr. Parker and Ms. Torkelson opened a
joint bank account together. (TR-141) According to Ms. Torkelson,
she then loaned Mr. Parker $8,000.00 to $10,000.00.

(TR-143, 690)

She also stated that Mr. Parker had put money into the joint
account they had opened.

(TR-154)

During her testimony, Ms.

Torkelson acknowledged that Mr. and Mrs. Parker had kept their
finances and businesses separate throughout their marriage.

(TR-

150, 603)
Upon learning of these developments, Mrs. Parker, as a cosignor, became concerned over Mr. Parker being able to draw on the
line of credit and then transfer those funds over to the account
he had with Ms. Torkelson.

(TR-465)

Consequently Mrs. Parker

withdrew sufficient monies from Mr. Parker's business account, on
7
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which she was authorized to sign (TR-490) to pay off the balance
on the line of credit and all of the parties' credit cards and
marital debt.

(TR-54)

She further asked that the line be frozen

to prevent her from having further liability on the line Mrs.
Parker had originally co-signed on the line to allow Mr. Parker
to qualify for the same.

(TR-525)

Mr. Parker admitted that all

marital debts had been paid off by Mrs. Parker at the time of
separation.

(TR-843)

Mr. Parker and Ms*. Torkelson testified at trial that their
relationship was
However

on

cross

strictly a business relationship.
examination,

Mr.

Parker

did

not

(TR-142)
deny

the

existence of a romantic relationship with Ms. Torkelson (TR-854).
Also, he provided no documentation to reflect repayment of the
loan he claimed she had earlier made to him, or what he had done
with those monies.

(TR-833)

Ms. Torkelson had been Mrs. Parker's best friend.

(TR-151)

She had worked at Freedom Mortgage and had handled the financing
of many of the real estate sales transactions in which Mrs. Parker
had been involved in over the years.

At trial, Ms. Torkelson

denied a romantic relationship with Mr. Parker.
were merely close personal friends. (TR-601)

She said they

Kevin Gates, the

president of Freedom Mortgage, testified that he was required to
terminate Ms. Torkelson because she had lied to customers on
numerous occasions during the course of her employment. (TR-242243)

He further testified that over the 16 years he had business

8
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dealings with Mrs. Parker, he found her to always have been honest
and trustworthy.

(TR-243)

Murray Parkway Project
There was substantial evidence presented at trial on the
Murray Parkway property.

Mr. Parker has provided this Court with

only a portion of the evidence the trial court considered in
deciding how that asset should be valued and distributed.

The

property consisted of • approximately 32.5 acres of undeveloped
ground located in Murray, Utah.

(Ex. P-40)

A portion of the

property was originally owned by Mr. Parker's parents and other
portions were owned by other individuals including some relatives
of Mr. Parker who had no association or dealings with him.
127-130; 655)

(TR-

These parties had first sold the property to a

developer who defaulted under the original purchase agreement.
At the time of the first sale, the sellers had been asked to
subordinate their interests to those of the lender.

Mrs. Parker

had advised Mr. Parker's parents and relatives not to do so.
84)

By so doing, they were able to maintain a first position in

the property and subsequently foreclose on and retain it.
848)

(TR-

(TR-

[A fellow seller did not subordinate and consequently lost

his interest in the property to the original lender. (TR-848)]
Following

its

foreclosure,

Mrs.

Parker

and

a

business

associate, Mr. Martin Merrill, approached the original sellers
about the sale of the property to them.

(TR-317)

A limited

liability company was formed and an Agreement to Purchase was
9
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signed

(Ex. P-62, P-63) by Mrs. Parker and Mr. Merrill.

Mr.

Parker did not want to be involved in the development process or
the limited liability company.

(TR-89)

Rather, in keeping with

his prior practices, he was interested in acquiring lots in the
development

on

which

to

subdivided and approved.

build

homes,

once

the

project

was

(TR-91)

The property was purchased in August 1995, approximately two
months before the parties separated. Following its purchase, Mrs.
Parker expended substantial time, effort and money in beginning
the process of securing the necessary government approvals to
subdivide.

(TR-91)

Mr. Parker did nothing and contributed no

monies towards this project.

(TR-91)

As of the date of trial, almost 2 years after the divorce had
been filed, the subdivision was still in the planning process and
had not been approved.

(TR-323, 342)

At trial, Mrs. Parker

introduced Ex. P-59 which reflected all of the work she had put
into attempting to subdivide this property.

(TR-531)

She also

introduced Ex. P-64 which reflected all of the expenses which had
been incurred and paid or were still owed on the project.

All of

these expenses had been paid with Mrs. Parker's earnings from her
businesses.

(TR-546)

At the time of trial, this property was

still raw land and had not been subdivided.
Mr.

Merrill

testified

that

there

had

(TR-533)
been

significant

engineering fees incurred to date (TR-322) and that there would
be substantial future development costs in order to secure the
necessary approval and complete the subdivision. (TR-323) He went
10
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on to say that the limited liability company was having access
problems with the Murray City (TR-342) and that the present value
of

the

land

would

not

be

development was completed.

the

value

of

the

land

once

the

(TR-344) He said he did not know what

that value might be in the future, if and when the subdivision was
completed.

(TR-344)

He said Mrs. Parker was the principal force

in acquiring the property.

(Tr-329)

He went on to testify that

Mr. Parker had done nothing on the project other than to sit in
on a meeting with the* Parker family.
Parker

put

the

deal

together.

(TR-359)

(TR-360)

He

He said Mrs.
concluded

his

testimony by stating that Mr. Parker had filed a separate civil
lawsuit against the limited liability company, Mrs. Parker and
himself, seeking a 25% interest in the property.

(TR-360, 362)

That lawsuit was pending at the time this divorce case was tried.
Mr.

Parker

admitted

he had

connection with the project.

done

little

(TR-849, 852)

if

anything

in

He said Mrs. Parker

and Mr. Merrill had done all of the development work to date.
(TR-84 9)

He said he had never done a subdivision development

(TR-853) and that his wife and Mr. Merrill had put a lot of time
and effort into the project. (TR-853)

He admitted filing a civil

lawsuit and a related lis pendens in connection with his claim
that he should have an interest in the limited liability company
and the project.

(TR-868)

He also acknowledged that his parents were able to retain
their portion of the property because of Mrs. Parker's advice to

11
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them regarding not subordinating their interests at the time of
the original sale.

(TR-848)

Finally, the only evidence before the trial court as to the
value of the property as of the date the parties' marriage was
terminated (i.e., April 15, 1996) was an appraisal performed by
Mr. Jerry Webber.
(Ex.P-40)

A

It was received into evidence by stipulation.

copy of this exhibit

Addendum to this Brief.
worth $1,072,800.

has been included

in the

Mr. Webber concluded the property was

It had debt against it of $842,340 (Ex. P-41,

included in the Addendum to this Brief).

That resulted in a net

equity of $230,460 of which Mr. and Mrs. Parker owned a one-half
interest of $115,23 0. Mr. Parker presented no evidence as to what
the value of this property was either as of April 15, 1996 or the
date of trial.

He testified, over objection, as to what he

thought the future value of this property would be (TR-771) and
stated he wanted to receive a 25% interest in the property because
of the future profits he speculated could be realized when the
development was completed.

(TR-774) Mr. Parker failed to present

any expert testimony as to what the value of this property was at
any point in time.

Bank Accounts
It was undisputed that throughout the marriage the parties
maintained

their own

separate

bank

accounts

into which

deposited their own earnings/income (TR-408, 603, 674)

they

Each then

transferred monies from those separate business accounts into a
12
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joint account from which various family expenses were paid and
also into a vehicle leasing account from which their automobile
expenses were made.

(TR-182, 670) Mr. Parker is incorrect in his

statement regarding what evidence was before the trial court in
connection with the parties' bank accounts. Mrs. Parker presented
testimony and documentary evidence as to the balances in the
parties' bank accounts as of April 15, 1996. (TR-530 and Ex. P-4A;
P-60), both of which have been included in the Addendum to this
Brief). Both parties testified that they each had business and
personal expenses which were paid from their respective business
accounts between the date they separated and April 15, 1996.
83 8)

(TR-

Neither party provided any detailed accounting as to those

expenses.

Also, Mr. Parker took the position that any profits he

made on lots he sold after separation should be his alone.

(TR-

838)
Mr. Parker called Mr. Robert Miller in an attempt to trace
monies each party had received and spent during this period.

Mr.

Miller testified that both parties had large sums of money going
into and out of their accounts. (TR-561) (This was in large part
due to the nature of each parties' respective business) . He said
that there had been multiple transfers from account to account.
(TR-628)

In direct examination, he said that in his review he

could not locate $62,991.91.00.

(TR-567)

On cross examination

he admitted he had included a $16,000.00 deposit made by Mrs.
Parker after April 15, 1996, (TR-629) but had not considered any
deposits made by Mr. Parker after that date.
13
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(TR-642)

Mrs.

Parker testified she had used the $16,000.00 to pay income taxes
which were due. (TR-646)

Further, Mr. Miller admitted that he had

not taken into consideration any outstanding business or personal
account payables in connection with determining what the net
amount of the bank account balances were as of April 15, 1996,
(TR-63) and admitted that any such expenses should have been
backed out to arrive at a more accurate figure as to what monies
each party had as of April 15, 1996.

(TR-643)

He also admitted

that the funds he claimed were unaccounted for could have been
used for family living expenses between the date the parties
separated and April 15, 1996, the date the parties' marriage was
terminated.

(TR-635)

He said he had added the funds he said were

unaccounted for to Mrs. Parker's side of the ledger simply because
he could not find them.

(TR-636)

Finally, both sides presented evidence on the bank account
balances that existed as of April 15, 1996.
10)

(See Ex. P-4A and D-

Mr. Parker's claim that only he presented evidence on this

issue is incorrect.
Mr. Parker has omitted the above testimony and evidence from
his Statement of Facts and in so doing has not provided this Court
with all of the background necessary to understand how the parties
handled their finances and assets during their marriage, as well
as facts very pertinent to the Murray Parkway property and the
numerous bank accounts in issue.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A

trial

court

is

given

broad

discretion

property distributions in divorce actions.

in

fashioning

Appellate courts are

reluctant to second guess a trial court's decision in divorce
actions because the trial court is in the advantaged position of
having actually heard the testimony of the parties and their
witnesses and observed their demeanor.

When a trial court's

decision is appealed,the burden is on the party appealing to
demonstrate

that

the

substantial

discretion

trial

court

afforded

it

in

some

in valuing,

distributing the assets of the parties.
evidence

presented

appealing

party

at trial
and

the

way

is viewed
Appellant

abused

that

dividing

and

In that regard, the
in favor of

is

charged

the nonwith

the

responsibility of marshalling the evidence which supports the
trial court's decision and then demonstrating that that evidence,
when compared with the evidence presented by the Appellant, is
insufficient to support the trial court's decision.

Mr. Parker

has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in
how it valued and distributed the marital estate. He likewise has
failed

in his duty to properly marshall the evidence

in his

attempt to challenge the propriety of the trial court's decision.
POINT II
Under Utah law, a trial court has the discretion to bifurcate
any issues/issues in a particular case.

A decision to bifurcate
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will not be overturned on appeal unless it can be shown that the
trial court in some way abused that discretion.
given

the

nature

and

history

of

the

In this case,

parties'

respective

businesses/occupations and the desire of Mrs. Parker to get on
with her life, there was more than an adequate and justifiable
basis for the court to decide to bifurcate this case, grant a
decree of divorce and terminate the parties' relationship as
husband and wife.

Mr. Parker has not shown that the trial court

abused its discretion in this regard.
POINT III
Under Utah law, the date on which to value a marital estate
in divorce actions is the date of the parties' divorce.

It is as

of this date that the parties' legal relationship as husband and
wife ends.

A decree of divorce was entered on April 15, 1996 and

the trial court followed Utah law in determining that that was the
appropriate date on which to value this marital estate.

A trial

court may select an alternative valuation date if there is good
cause

to do so.

In this case, Mr. Parker wanted

a

future

valuation date assigned to some assets (i.e. the Murray Parkway
property) and a date of separation valuation date assigned to
others, (i.e. the parties' bank accounts), based upon his claim
that Mrs. Parker had improperly used or dissipated marital assets.
The trial court did not find that to be the case.

It correctly

followed Utah law in determining that the proper date on which to
value this marital estate was April 15, 1996
parties' marriage ended.
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-

the date the

POINT IV
Mr. Parker presented no evidence as to the value of the
Murray Parkway property other than to claim he felt it would be
worth a lot of money sometime in the future, after it had been
developed and subdivided.

The only credible evidence on the

present value of this property was the appraisal of Mr. Jerry
Webber, which was received into evidence pursuant to stipulation.
Mr. Parker has failed in his claim that this item of property was
improperly or incorrectly valued by the trial court.
Mr. Parker's claim that this property should have been
divided in kind between the parties is likewise without merit.
It is the policy in Utah to avoid keeping couples in business
relationships after a divorce occurs. The trial court correctly
followed Utah law when it awarded Mrs. Parker this property and
gave Mr. Parker assets to offset the value of his interest in the
property as a result of the marriage relationship.
POINT V
Mr. Parker claimed throughout these proceedings that Mrs.
Parker had dissipated marital assets. The trial court determined
that not be the case.

Both sides presented evidence as to what

monies were in their respective bank accounts as of the date of
the divorce.

Both sides had outstanding business payables on

which neither presented evidence.

Both sides paid personal and

business expenses from their respective accounts.

Given the

conflict in the evidence regarding the balances in these accounts,
it was appropriate for the trial court to simply award each party
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the monies in his/her accounts.

Even if that distribution was

unequal, it was within the prerogative of the trial court to do
so as long as it felt that the distribution was equitable.
Parker

has not

shown that

the trial

court

abused

Mr.

the broad

discretion afforded it in how it distributed these accounts.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS THE TRIAL
COURT HAS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION
CONCERNING
PROPERTY/DEBT
DISTRIBUTIONS AND ITS DECISION WILL
NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS IT IS
CLEARLY UNJUST OR A CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
In divorce actions a trial court is vested with considerable
and broad discretion in fashioning fair and equitable remedies for
the parties on the issues of property/debt distributions. Its
decision will not be changed by the appellate court unless it can
be demonstrated that the decision is clearly unjust or there was
a clear abuse of discretion. Walters v. Walters, 812 P. 2d 64 (Utah
App. 1991).

Mr. Parker has failed to show either.

In order to prevail on this appeal, Mr. Parker is required
to show that the trial court, in making its distribution of
property, misunderstood or misapplied the law, entered findings
not supported by the evidence, or caused a serious inequity so as
to constitute an abuse of discretion.
P.2d 409, 410 (Utah, 1977).

English v. English, 565

As was clearly stated in Searle v.

Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974):
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Although it is both the duty and the prerogative of
this court in a case of equity to review the facts as
well as the law, Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution
of Utah, the trial judge has considerable latitude of
discretion in adjusting the financial and property
interests in a divorce case. The actions of the trial
court are indulged with the presumption of validity,
and the burden is on appellant to prove such a serious
inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
(Footnote) There is no fixed formula for the division
of property; Section 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953 provides that
when a decree of divorce is made the court may make
such orders in relation to property as may be
equitable. (footnote) Jd. at 700.
In making

a property

distribution,

the

trial

court

may

consider numerous factors in arriving at an equitable result.
Among those are such things as the property each party brought
into the marriage; the property acquired during the marriage and
the efforts and contributions of each party in the acquisition of
such

property;

gifts

received

during

the

marriage;

and

inheritances. Because of the foregoing, a property division need
not be equal, but only equitable. See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 23 6
P.2d 1066 (Utah 1951).
Mr. Parker's burden is not an easy one and the record does
not show in any way, an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
As was stated in

Jackman v. Jackman, 696 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1985):

We have long adhered to the view that an appellate
court cannot remain a court of appeals and invite a
review of every case decided by a lower court where its
judgment fails to satisfy one or both parties to the
litigation. Neither can we properly serve our appellate
function if we modify the factual determination of a
trial court whenever we take a differing view of the
evidence. Because the trial court alone can assess the
demeanor and relative credibility of the witnesses, it
is charged with the fact finding function and is
responsible for determining an equitable resolution of
the matter based on those findings. We accord its
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actions broad deference. On appeal, we review the
findings of fact only to determine whether they are
supported by substantial record evidence. And we will
not disturb the conclusions drawn from these findings
unless some clear abuse of discretion is shown. Id. At
1192 (citations omitted).
In addition, it appears that Mr. Parker is operating under
a misconception as to what constitutes fact and what is evidence.
Simply because he presented evidence to the court in support of
his position, does not automatically require the court to treat
that evidence as fact. *In this case, the record reflects that the
trial

court

accepted

evidence

from both

sides, weighed

that

evidence and then found facts upon which to fashion remedies fair
and equitable to both sides. It is not an error for a trial court
to discount or not even consider evidence offered by one side or
the other. In fact, it is the trial court's duty to analyze
conflicting

evidence

ultimate facts are.

in the process of

determining

what

the

Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah,

1995).
Further it does not appear from Mr. Parker's Brief that he
has challenged any particular findings of fact.

Rather he seems

to be dissatisfied with the overall remedy fashioned by the trial
court, based upon the facts found and as supported by the evidence
presented.

Assuming only for the sake of argument that his Brief

is challenging the factual findings of the trial court, Mr. Parker
has the duty to marshall all of the evidence in support of the
findings which he challenges and then demonstrate

that, even

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings,
20
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the evidence is insufficient to support those findings.
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88

(Utah App. 1989) and

Scharf v. BMG Corp. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah, 1985).
has failed to meet this requirement.

(See

Mr. Parker

He fails to mention the

evidence and testimony in support of Mrs. Parker's position on the
Murray Parkway property and the balances in the parties' bank
accounts.

(See Mrs. Parker's Statement of Facts infra).

On this

basis alone Mr. Parker's appeal should be denied.
The entire thrust*of Mr. Parker's appeal is that the trial
court did not give him what he wanted.

It is an attempt to simply

reargue above what has already been argued below and as such
should not be considered on appeal.

(See Campbell v. Box Elder

County, 962, P.2d 806 (Utah App. 1998).

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED
THE BROAD DISCRETION AFFORDED IT
WHEN IT BIFURCATED THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THIS MATTER
The authority to bifurcate a proceeding and try individual
issues separately is found in Rule 42(b) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which states:
(b)
Separate
trials.
The court in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, thirdparty claims, or issues.
Id.
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Mr. Parker correctly recognizes that a decision as to whether
or not to bifurcate proceedings in a particular case is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court.
Trial court's "enjoy considerable discretion" in
determining whether to bifurcate issues under Rule 42
(citation) Olympus Hills Center Ltd. v. Smith's Food,
889 P.2d 445, 462 (Utah App 1994)
Given this discretion, it then becomes incumbent upon the
trial court to look at the facts of the particular case before it
and determine whether or not it would be appropriate and in the
«

interest of justice to bifurcate and resolve certain issues before
the resolution of other issues. In divorce cases, that discretion
should be even broader given the responsibility of the trial court
to fashion a remedy which is fair to both parties and the need to
bring some predictability to the parties' future lives as quickly
as possible.
Mrs. Parker is aware of no Utah cases dealing directly with
bifurcation of the marital status from support, custody and
property issues. However, other jurisdictions have concluded that
such an approach is not only permissible but in some cases
necessary to ensure that one party is not allowed to take
advantage

of

the

other

party

by

simply

using

the

legal

relationship of husband and wife to gain an unfair advantage in
a final property debt distribution.
In Hull v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 352 P.2d
161, (Cal. 1960) (en banc), the California Supreme Court observed
that separating the termination of a marriage from controversies
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over spousal support and division of marital property is not a new
idea:
Severance of a personal relationship which the law has
found to be unworkable and, as a result, injurious to
the public welfare is not dependent upon final
settlement of property disputes.
Society will be
little concerned if the parties engage in property
litigation of however long duration; it will be much
concerned if two people are forced to remain legally
bound to one another when this status can do nothing
but engender additional bitterness and unhappiness. .
. . Otherwise property disputes, real and specious,
could continue for years, effectively preventing the
legal establishment of any other relationship by either
party.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at 166

See also

In re Marriage of Hermsen, 27 Wash. App. 318, 617

P.2d 462, 465 (1980) (bifurcation promotes legislative "intent to
provide prompt dissolution of unworkable marriages without regard
to fault or a period of separation").

Relying on Hull, the

California Court of Appeals held in Gionis v. The Superior Court
of Orange County, 202 Ca.App. 3d 786, 248 Cal.Rptr. 741 (1988),
that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to
bifurcate the issue of the marital status from all other issues.
In observing that the husband's declaration contained sufficient
reasons supporting his Motion to Bifurcate, the Court stated:
Consistent with the legislative policy favoring no
fault dissolution of marriage, only slight evidence is
necessary to obtain bifurcation and resolution of
marital status. On the other hand, the spouse opposing
bifurcation must present compelling reasons for denial.
Id. at 790.
Financial
continuation

and social restraints

of

an

irretrievable

imposed by the

relationship

bifurcation when a party requests such relief.
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enforced

should

compel

Constraint on

"financial or social endeavors" formed the basis of the husband's
declaration in support of bifurcation in Gionis, supra.

The

husband's declaration in Gionis stated in part:
I do not want the status of my marriage to effect [sic]
my investments I wish to make. As examples, I should
not be required to seek a quitclaim deed from [wife] if
I decide to invest in real property or other business
ventures, nor should I be required to obtain [wife's]
consent to make application for and sign any loan
documents regarding my finances. I should not have to
run the risk that any business deals I decide to make
are construed to be a community property because
community credit rather than my own separate credit was
utilized. . . . Id. at 789.
The court held that the husband's declaration contained sufficient
reasons supporting his motion to bifurcate.

Id. at 790.

It also

held that he was not required to make a compelling showing of
need, Id. at 788, as the trial court had required.

Rather, it

required the wife to demonstrate why bifurcation should not be
granted.
Like California, in 1987 the Utah legislature amended its
divorce statute and eliminated fault as a basis for terminating
a marriage and determined that a marriage could be ended simply
because the parties had experienced irreconcilable differences.
(See §30-3-1, et. seq. Utah Code Ann. ) . With the concept of fault
gone and the fact that neither party was requesting alimony from
the other, the trial court correctly concluded that there was no
justifiable reason for the continuation of the legal relationship
of Mr. and Mrs. Parker as husband and wife.
In deciding whether or not to bifurcate in the Parker case,
the trial court was faced with the following considerations:
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1)

Throughout the marriage, the parties had kept
their respective businesses separate.

2)

At

the time of separation each party was

continuing to operate his/her own business.
Mr. Parker was buying and selling lots and
building and selling homes.

Mrs. Parker was

selling and developing real estate.

She was

taking new listings, earning commissions and
expending

substantial

attempting

to

develop

time
the

and

effort

Murray

in

Parkway

property, a project in its infant stages.
3)

The marriage was over and there was no chance
of reconciliation.

4)

Neither side was requesting alimony from the
other.

5)

Mrs. Parker

(and most

likely Mr.

Parker)

wanted to get on with her life.
With these facts before it, both the domestic

relations

commissioner and the trial judge came to the following correct
conclusion.

It is better to terminate this marriage so as to

establish a date from which each party could pursue their own
business and get on with their respective lives than it would be
to continue the marriage and further complicate the financial
issues with claims as to who might have earned or acquired what
between the time of the parties' separation and the time the
matter was ultimately tried.

Also, in so doing, neither party

25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would then be allowed to sit back and do nothing, thereby being
able to unfairly take advantage of the other's efforts to improve
his/her financial situation.
In bifurcating this case, the trial court did not value the
marital estate nor did it make any distribution of the parties'
assets and liabilities. It merely determined that under the facts
of this case it was appropriate to terminate the parties' marriage
and in so doing establish a date on which to value the estate.
Mr. Parker claims *that he was prejudiced by the bifurcation.
That is not so.

There was no "de facto" distribution of the

parties' assets as a result of bifurcation. That distribution was
an issue reserved for trial.
parties' assets.

There was no valuation of the

That also was an issue to be resolved at trial

and each party had the opportunity to present evidence at trial
as to what the value of each particular asset was as of April 15,
1996 and more importantly to request that a particular asset be
awarded to him or her.
That is exactly what then happened at trial.

Each party

requested that he/she be awarded particular assets, and assigned
values to those assets as of the date their marriage ended.

It

was at the time of trial that Judge Pueler made what she felt to
be an equitable distribution of those assets and liabilities after
she had listened to five days of testimony from the parties and
their witnesses and received approximately 150 exhibits.
Until the trial court made its final decision, neither party
knew what assets he/she would receive.

What each did know was
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that each was required to disclose all assets he/she had as of
April 15, 1996 and that if either had used marital assets to
acquire separate property after April 15, 1996, that would have
to be accounted for in the final property/debt distribution.
Mr.

Parker

bifurcation.

claims

he was prejudiced

by

the

order of

Clearly that is not the case. Rather, it was Mrs.

Parker who would have been prejudiced because, as a practical
matter, she would have been prevented from doing anything other
than trying to maintain* the "status quo" while waiting for a trial
date.

She would have been prevented from increasing the value of

her real estate business. She certainly would have been reluctant
to acquire more assets as a result of her earnings because of the
very just fear that Mr. Parker would be able to sit back, wait and
possibly delay the action for the sole purpose of being able to
share in what she was acquiring after their marriage was legally
over.
So in order to avoid prejudice to either party, the domestic
relations commissioner and the trial court both felt that the
fairer approach would be to terminate the parties' marriage.

In

that way, a definite valuation date could be established to use
in dividing up what the parties had acquired to that point in time
and to allow each party to get on with their own respective
financial lives.
Mr. Parker's claim that the trial court abused the broad
discretion afforded it in deciding whether or not to bifurcate
this case is without merit.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED UTAH LAW
IN DETERMINING THAT THE DATE THE
PARTIES'
MARRIAGE
RELATIONSHIP
ENDED WAS THE APPROPRIATE DATE ON
WHICH TO VALUE THE MARITAL ESTATE
Mr. Parker claims that the trial court abused the broad
discretion he admits it has, in deciding that the proper date to
value this marital estate was the date on which the parties'
marriage relationship ended.

His claim is without merit.

Mr. Parker is correct in his statement that the general rule
in Utah is that the marital estate should be valued at the time
a Decree of Divorce is entered.
The marital estate is evaluated
according to the existing property interest
at the time the marriage is terminated by the
decree of the court (footnote) Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980)
[See also Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052
(Utah App. 1987)
which allows the trial
court to use an alternative date if a party
has dissipated assets].
Consequently,

in deciding that the proper time to value the

marital estate was the date the parties' marriage ended, the
domestic relations commissioner and the trial judge followed Utah
law.
Since there is some discretion afforded a trial court as to
when to value a marital estate, the first question to be asked is
"was there a good reason to select that date as opposed to some
other date?"

The first reason is that the date of the Decree was

the date trial courts have been instructed to use by the Utah
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appellate courts.

The second reason was succinctly articulated

by Commissioner Arnett when he first considered Mrs. Parker's
request to bifurcate:
I think where this case really lies is that the Court
has to take judicial notice of the fact that there is
a booming real estate market in this valley, its
credible that the Plaintiff would not want to devote
herself to a real estate business, work hard, and then
have to share the rewards of her work with the
Defendant, where the parties are no longer together and
there is no basis other than a legal fiction that they
should share in their continuing labors.
For these
reasons, I am going to recommend that the Motion to
Bifurcate is granted. (R-353)
Judge Pueler had the benefit of that logic when she was asked
to review Commissioner Arnett's recommendation.

She likewise

concluded that the logic was sound and stated:
. . . The Court finds that pursuant to Rule 42 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure it is for the convenience
of the parties to grant bifurcation and Defendant is
not prejudiced in any way in this matter since all the
assets accumulated by the parties prior to the granting
of the Divorce will need to be disclosed . . . (R-119120)
By making this decision the trial court in no way made any
distribution of the assets in question as argued by Mr. Parker.
Rather it selected a point in time consistent with the general
rule in Utah to determine what comprised the marital estate and
what the estate was worth at that particular point in time.
By taking this approach neither party was prejudiced.

Rather

each knew what assets and liabilities were in existence at that
point in time and each could then argue as to what assets each
desired to be awarded.
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Also, and of greater importance, the setting of the valuation
date

as

the

date

the

parties' marriage

relationship

ended,

provided each party with peace of mind and some certainty that
either

could make

business

new property

relationships

and

acquisitions, enter

expend

time

and

effort

into new
in

their

respective businesses that then could not be taken advantage of
by the other party simply based upon the claim that they were
married to one another.
Contrary to all of*Mr. Parker's arguments, this was the fair
way to ensure that one party was not allowed to simply sit back
and then at some unknown future point in time take advantage of
the hard work, time and effort which had been expended by the
other in furthering and bettering his/her financial position.
Almost VA years after the decision to bifurcate was made and
only two weeks before trial, Mr. Parker again argued that the
valuation date of the marital estate should be the date of trial,
not the date the parties' marriage was terminated.

Judge Pueler

once again, for the second time, considered what would be the most
appropriate and fair date on which to value the marital estate.
Once again, her judgment remained the same.

She again listened

to Mr. Parker's unfounded claims of Mrs. Parker's hiding and
dissipating assets and concluded that the proper date on which to
value this particular marital estate was the date on which the
parties' marriage ended.

However, in her Order she went on to

state that:
2) The court finds that there will be two exceptions
to the date of valuation. The first exception is that
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either party has used a marital asset to increase the
value of a post-marital asset, then that asset's value
at the date of trial may be considered.
Further, an
exception will be granted if either party has hidden an
asset or hidden the value of a property,
3) The court specifically finds that the legal
relationship of the parties ended at the date of the
decree and that is the appropriate date of valuation.
(TR-724-725 Order drafted by Mr. Parker's counsel)
So, going into trial, each side had the right and opportunity
to demonstrate that the other side had used marital assets to
acquire non-marital assets or that the other side had hidden or
*

not disclosed assets.

At trial, both sides gave it "their best

shot" to demonstrate that the other had hidden or used marital
assets to acquire or maintain non-marital assets.

Neither side

convinced the trial court that that had occurred.

In fact, the

trial

court's

findings

are

noticeably

and

properly

silent

regarding those claims simply because the evidence demonstrated
that

such

activities

did

not

occur.

Because

neither

side

demonstrated that there were circumstances to justify deviation
from the general rule regarding valuation dates, the trial court
was most correct in using the date the parties' legal relationship
as husband and wife terminated as the date to value the marital
estate.
Parenthetically, it is important for this Court to note that
at no time during the proceedings below did Mr. Parker present or
offer to present any evidence whatsoever as to the value of the
parties' assets as of the date of trial.

One would think that if

he felt so strongly about this issue he would have at least
attempted to present evidence by way of proffer, as to the value
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of the properties in question as of the date of trial.
in all respects to do so.

He failed

Mr. Parker's claims of error on the

issue of valuation dates are without merit.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN CONNECTION WITH THE MANNER IT
VALUED AND DISTRIBUTED THE MURRAY
PARKWAY PROPERTY
Mr. Parker's argument regarding how the trial court valued
and distributed the Murray Parkway property can be summarized as
follows:
1)

Because

the

potential,

property
the

trial

had

future

court

should

development
not

have

assigned a present value to it; and
2.)

Because there was the potential that the property
could be worth more at some time in the future,
the trial court should have awarded the property
to both parties in equal shares.

The questions before the trial court on the Murray Parkway
property issue were likewise two-fold:
1)

Was there sufficient evidence to allow the trial
court to value this property as it did?; and

2)

Based upon the evidence presented, was the trial
court obligated to award the parties equal
kind) interests in this property?
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(in

Based upon the broad discretion afforded trial courts in
fashioning remedies in divorce actions, the answer to the first
question is "yes" and the answer to the second question is "no."

A.

Valuation.

The only evidence presented to the trial court on the value
of this property as of April 15, 1996 was the appraisal performed
by Jerry Webber.

[Ex. P-40; admitted by stipulation (TR-25); a

copy has been included in the Addendum to this Brief.]

Mr. Parker

presented no evidence as to what this property was worth as of
April 15, 1996; or as of the date of trial.

His only evidence as

to value consisted of what he thought the property might be worth
at some unknown point of time in the future after the work and
expenses related to its future development had been completed and
paid.

(TR-770-774)
Trial courts in Utah are not required to accept speculative

testimony as to the value of a particular piece of property in
divorce actions.

As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in

Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221 (Utah 1987),
. . therefore, we do not think the trial
courts
refusal
to
speculate
about
hypothetical future consequences [valuation
of a pension plan] was an abuse of
discretion.
Id. at 224
[Bracket language
added]
See also Morgan v. Morgan, 765 P.2d 684, 689
(Utah App. 1990)
The

evidence presented

by Mr. Parker

consisted

only of

speculative statements that the property might be worth much more
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at some time in the future after it had been developed, subdivided
and readied for sale

-

something that had not happened as of

April 15, 1996, or even as of the date this matter was tried.
On the other hand, Mrs. Parker presented solid, unchallenged,
expert testimony as to what this property was actually worth on
the date the parties' marriage ended.
was not hypothetical.

It was not speculative, it

Rather, it was credible and unchallenged.

The trial court's decision as to the value of this property
was supported by credible and undisputed evidence. Mr. Parker has
shown no error in how the trial court valued this.
B.
Mr.

Parker's

claim

Distribution.
that

the

trial

court

should

have

distributed the Murray Parkway project in equal shares to he and
Mrs. Parker is likewise without merit.

That claim flies in the

face of the following:
1)

Throughout the marriage the parties had kept their
respective businesses separate.

(TR-19, 20, 179,

603, 674)
2)

Mrs. Parker was involved in real estate sales and
development.

(TR-17)

Mr.

Parker

operated a construction company.
3)

and

(TR-658)

Mrs. Parker acquired an interest in the property
through her real estate company.

4)

owned

(TR-84)

Mr. Parker did not want to be involved in the
limited liability company which was developing the
property.

(TR-89, 90, 91, 320)
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He did not do any

work on the subdivision (TR-91) or contribute any
monies towards it.
5)

(TR-320, 533)

Mrs. Parker had expended trial time effort and
monies

in

approvals

attempting

to

secure

in order to develop

the

necessary

the property, a

substantial portion of which occurred after April
15, 1996, the date the Decree was entered.

(TR-

514, 849, 853, Ex. P-59)
6)

There would have to be substantial additional fees
and

costs

necessary

incurred
approvals

in

order

in order

to
to

secure

the

subdivide

and

construct improvements such as roads, sewer and
utilities on the property.
7)

Mr.

Parker

had

subdivisions.

no

experience

(TR-853)

substantial experience.
8)

in

Mrs.

developing
Parker

had

(TR-471)

Mrs. Parker wanted all financial ties with her
husband terminated.

9)

(TR-536, Ex. P-64)

There

was

(TR-521)

substantial

animosity

between

the

parties.
10)

Mr. Parker had filed a separate lawsuit and a lis
pendens against Mrs. Parker and her partner Mr.
Merrill over ownership of the property.

11)

(TR-360)

There was credible undisputed evidence presented
at trial as to what the property was worth on or
about April 15, 1996.

(Ex. P-40
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After considering all of the above, the trial court again
exercised its broad discretion and made the following finding:
21.
Murray Parkway.
The Murray Parkway Associates
property should be awarded to Petitioner.
The
testimony of both parties established that while
Petitioner has played a primary role in developing
other properties, Respondent has no similar experience.
Petitioner has been the person, as between these two
parties, who has carried out the responsibilities of
planning, meeting with officials, paying creditors and
property owners on this project. The Court received
Petitioner's Exhibit 59, which represents the numerous
correspondence with the property owners, the City and
other
individuals
to
substantiate
Petitioner's
substantial involvement with the development of Murray
Parkway.
The Court further finds that Petitioner
assisted Respondent's parents in maintaining their
property when it was foreclosed upon some years ago,
when it was sold to a previous buyer. Petitioner also
assisted the Parkers in the foreclosure in advising
them not to subordinate their interests, as some of the
other property owners had, who eventually lost their
properties. Given the animosity between the parties,
Respondent's request that he become involved in the
project with Petitioner is not feasible.
The Court
further finds that Respondent has filed a lawsuit
against Petitioner, entitled Dale S. Parker v. Murray
Parkway Associates, a Utah Limited Liability Company,
Carla K. Parker, an individual, and Martin W. Merrily,
an individual, Civil No. 970904981.
In addition,
although the property is a marital asset, it is
impossible to project future value. The risk of profit
or loss will remain with the Petitioner and the value
of the property should be divided as of the divorce
Decree. The value of Murray Parkway therefore, is the
sum of $115,230.00, which is the present value.
Respondent's one-half share, which should be credited
to him, is the sum of $57,615.00. (R-830, 831)
Once again, in awarding this property to Mrs. Parker, the
trial court followed the general rule in Utah which was set forth
in Arcryle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984) (quoting Savacre v.
Savacre, 658, P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J. dissenting) :
Wherever possible, this Court avoids division of
marital stock between parties because it forces them to
be in a close economic relationship which has every
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potential
for further contention,
friction, and
litigation, especially when third parties having
nothing to do with the divorce will also necessarily be
involved. Id. at 471.
Likewise, in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)
the Utah Supreme Court indicated that it is better practice to
determine the present value of an asset

(in Woodward it was a

pension plan) and then award one party that asset and the other
party offsetting assets.

In this case, the trial court followed

the Woodward approach and took into consideration Justice Durahms
caveat about keeping ex-spouses financially entangled.
long-term and deferred sharing of financial
interests are obviously susceptible to continued strife
and
hostility,
circumstances
which
our
Courts
traditionally strive to avoid to the greatest extent
possible . . .
Id. at 433.
Mr.

Parker argues that the trial court

should not have

followed this rule and relies on Savage v. Savage, supra, and Lee
v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987) in support of his position
that he should have been awarded one-half of the parties' interest
in the Murray Parkway property.

That reliance is misplaced.

Savage, supra is clearly distinguishable.

In that certain

case three qualified experts testified about the value of certain
stock the parties owned in a closely held family corporation with
three dramatically disparate values given to that stock. The Utah
Supreme Court held that trial court "had virtually no feasible
alternative to an in-kind division of the stock."

Id. at 1203.

In addition, the Savage court restressed the principle that "in
kind" divisions of marital property should be avoided if at all
possible.

Id. at 1205.

In the present case, the trial court had
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a real present value to place on the property verified by an
appraisal.
Likewise in Lee, supra the claim of error dealt with the
trial court's failure to value stock owned by the husband and then
to award any portion of that stock to the wife.

Lee is

distinguishable from the present case because the trial court, in
the case at bar, was able to place value on the Murray Parkway and
then included that value in the final property debt distribution.
Judge Pueler recognized the animosity between the parties.
She recognized that a present value could be placed on the
property. She recognized that the property was in the preliminary
stages

of

development

which

would

necessarily

require

the

expenditure of additional time, effort and money by Mrs. Parker.
She then did what she was supposed to do under Utah law.

She

placed a present value on the property, awarded it to Mrs. Parker
and awarded Mr. Parker assets to offset the value of the property
which Mrs. Parker received.
Mr.

Parker has not

demonstrated

that

the

trial

court

committed any error in how it valued and distributed the Murray
Parkway property.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN CONNECTION WITH THE MANNER IN
WHICH IT VALUED AND DISTRIBUTED THE
PARTIES' BANK ACCOUNTS
Mr. Parker claims in Points III and IV of his Brief that the
trial court erred by not accepting his position that the parties'
bank accounts should have been valued as of the date of the
parties' separation (Point IV) and by not accepting his evidence
as to the amount of monies in the various bank accounts that were
subject to division (Point III). Both claims are without merit.
Throughout the proceedings below, from the time this action
was filed through a five day trial and through numerous post-trial
motions,

Mr.

Parker

claimed

that

Mrs. Parker

had

failed

to

disclose, hidden, misappropriated and dissipated assets. In spite
of his repeated attempts to convince the trial court that this was
the case, the evidence demonstrated otherwise.
Mr.

Parker's

girlfriend

and

business

associate,

Tamara

Torkelson, testified that Mr. Parker had a good reputation.

(TR-

166) Mr. Kevin Gates, the president of Freedom Mortgage testified
that he had had numerous business transactions with Mrs. Parker
and he always found her to be an honest and trustworthy person.
(TR-243)

He also said that he had been required to fire Ms.

Torkelson because she had lied to customers. (TR-242, 243)

Mrs.

Parker testified that she had fully and completely disclosed and
accounted for her income and bank account balances (TR-526), and
that if anyone had failed to disclose assets, it was Mr. Parker
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[i.e., his bank account and business dealings with Ms. Torkelson
(TR-465); his endorsing her name on checks without her permission
(TR-60, 412); the value of the gold he owned (TR-505)].
This conflict
issue.

It

is

in testimony necessarily made credibility
well

established

that

the

issue

of

an

witness

credibility is an issue left to the trial court and appellate
courts will not attempt to "second guess" a trial court when it
comes to determining who was more credible in the proceedings
below (See Mostrancr v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 cert, denied 878 P.2d
1154

(Utah App. 1993); and Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d

1182

(Utah

1991)).
In this case the trial court did not accept Mr. Parker's
position that Mrs. Parker had dissipated

assets

(namely bank

account balances) between the date the parties separated and the
date of the Decree.

If it were inclined to do so and thereby

conclude that the date of separation would have been the date to
value these accounts, it would have first had to make specific
findings as to why the date of separation should be used as a
valuation date as opposed to the date the Decree of Divorce was
entered (gee Morgan v. Morgan, 765 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App. 1990).
In failing to make such a finding, the trial court refused
to

give

credence

necessarily

to

follows

Mr.
that

Parker's
under Utah

argument.
law,

Therefore,

in the

absence

it
of

circumstances justifying use of an alternative valuation date, the
proper date to value a marital estate is the date the parties'
marriage relationship terminated, i.e., the date of the Decree of
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Divorce.

(See Fletcher, supra.)

That is the valuation date the

trial court used and it committed no error in doing so.
In Point III of his Brief, Mr. Parker argues that the trial
court failed to divide the various bank accounts of the parties
in accord with the way Mr. Parker wanted them divided.

He also

claims that there was no evidence to support the way the trial
court divided these accounts.

That is simply not so.

First there was conflicting evidence as to what monies were
in these accounts as of*April 15, 1996. Mrs. Parker testified as
to the balances in these accounts as of that date in connection
with her proposed Property Debt Distributions

(Ex.P-4A).

She

also presented documentary evidence to support that testimony in
the form of banks statements reflecting the balances (Ex. P-60) .
Mr. Parker places great weight on the testimony of his
accountant Mr. Miller.

However, that testimony created more

questions than answers.

First, and of critical importance, Mr.

Miller stated he had not factored any accounts payable of either
party in arriving at his conclusion that there was approximately
$35,251.00 more in Mrs. Parker's accounts than there was in Mr.
Parker's accounts.

It must be kept in mind that with the

exception of one account, all of Mrs. Parker's other accounts were
business accounts into which she deposited her earnings and
commissions, and from which she paid the ongoing day-to-day
expenses of her real estate company.

Further, he had added a

$16,000.00 deposit made by Mrs. Parker after April 15, 1996. (TR629)

Mrs. Parker testified that that deposit was made to cover
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income tax checks which had been written before April 15, 1996.
(TR-890) Mr. Miller also acknowledged that he had not taken those
tax liabilities into account in arriving at his conclusion that
Mrs. Parker was receiving more monies than was Mr. Parker and that
these monies could have been used to pay income taxes. (R-62 9; TR628) Mrs. Parker also testified that between separating and April
15, 1996 she had used the monies in her accounts to pay business
as well as family living expenses.
53 9)

(TR-464, 472, 473, 483, 526,

Mr. Miller acknowledged that if those monies had been used

for family living expenses they should have then been deducted
from the amounts he claimed were unaccounted

for.

(TR 645)

Finally, Mr. Miller acknowledged that the bank account balances
reflected in Mrs. Parker's Exhibit P-60 agreed with what he found
those balances to be with the exception of a $2,000.00 transfer
(TR-627).
Based upon this conflicting evidence, the trial court made
the following specific findings about the parties' bank accounts:
As to the parties' bank accounts, the Court finds as
follows: the parties were separated for several months
prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. During
that time, each party operated his or her business,
derived income therefrom, paid debts and supported him
or herself.
Both parties testified that some bank
accounts were business accounts only, while others were
used for both personal and business purposes.
Both
parties also testified that business expenses were paid
from the accounts on an ongoing basis. In addition,
petitioner
testified
that
funds were
frequently
transferred from one account to another for both
business and personal reasons.
Both parties also
testified that monies came into the bank accounts from
various sources, including ordinary business income,
returns on business investments, monies from loans, or
monies from gross sales or commissions.
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Monies were also paid out of the accounts for numerous
purposes.
Some funds were used for the personal
support of each party; some were paid toward business
expenses or debts; some were used to purchase real
property which has been divided by this decision; and,
some funds were used to pay marital debts.
Some business and personal bank accounts were
commingled, and both parties used business income for
self support and payment of marital debts. There is no
specific accounting of all of the bank accounts,
however, either as to the source of deposits or nature
of expenditures, that will allow the Court to
accurately determine any net value of the accounts or
to divide the same fairly. Therefore, the Court awards
each account to the holder of the same, and makes no
valuation for purposes of the marital estate.
Minute Entry, p. 11 and 12 (R-665-666)
In making this finding and related award, the trial court
also took into consideration Mrs. Parker's position that in this
case, an equal division of the property would not necessarily be
an equitable division.

There is no fixed formula for dividing
(See Naranio v. Naranio,

property and debt in divorce actions.
751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1988).

However, Utah trial courts are

guided by the general instruction to allocate property in a manner
which best serves the needs of the parties and thus permits them
to pursue their separate lives.

[{See Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d

133, 135 (Utah 1987) ] .
Likewise, the trial court rejected Mr. Parker's position that
Mrs. Parker had in some way misused or dissipated any monies in
the various bank accounts at issue.

In so doing, it implicitly

determined that Mr. Miller's analysis as to the monies in these
accounts was deficient and incomplete.

The analysis did not

consider current payables. It included a $16,000 deposit made by
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Mrs. Parker after April 15, 1996, but did not contain any review
of monies Mr. Parker may have deposited in his accounts after that
date.

Faced with this conflicting and confusing evidence, the

trial court did the best job it could in resolving the bank
account issue in a manner which was fair to both parties.

As

Judge Pueler so appropriately observed in her ruling regarding Mr.
Parker's post trial motions
. . . We did try this case for five days and
I think that both sides had a complete and
fair opportunity to present whatever evidence
they wanted to present and I don't find a
basis, reviewing the pleadings, to grant a
new trial . . .
R-1027 at p. 26; p. 99
Addendum to this Brief.
The remedy fashioned by the trial court in handling the bank
accounts as it did, was the only way the issue could have been
handled given the conflicting evidence presented by both parties.
Mr.

Parker

has

not

shown

that

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion in how it handled the division and distribution of the
parties' bank accounts.

Points III and IV of his Brief are

without merit.
CONCLUSION
In

divorce

cases,

a

trial

court

is

charged

with

the

responsibility of receiving, reviewing and analyzing evidence on
financial matters and then fashioning a remedy which is fair to
both parties and allows each to get on with their respective
lives.

That is exactly what the trial court did in this case.

First, it properly exercised its discretion in bifurcating
this case.

It correctly recognized that this marriage was over
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and consequently each party should be given the opportunity to get
on with their respective financial lives without the fear that the
other would be able to "capitalize" on the ambition, hard work,
and

financial

progress

of

the

other while

waiting

for

that

ultimate trial date.
Second, it followed well established Utah law in determining
that the date the parties' marriage was legally terminated was the
appropriate date to value the entire marital estate.
Third,

it followed Utah law and acted within the broad

discretion afforded

it in the manner in which it valued and

distributed the Murray Parkway property.

Its decision on value

was based on the only credible evidence presented at trial as to
what this property was actually worth - the Webber appraisal (ExP40).

Its decision to award the property to Mrs. Parker was

correct in that to do otherwise would have placed the parties in
an ongoing hostile business relationship and would have unfairly
allowed Mr. Parker to take advantage of the work and effort Mrs.
Parker had put into the property after April 15, 1996.
Fourth, the trial court did the best job it could in placing
a value on and dividing the various bank accounts of the parties.
The evidence presented by the parties was extremely conflicting.
In spite of this, the trial court did not find that either party
had misappropriated or dissipated marital funds/assets.

Rather,

it found, in keeping with the way the parties had traditionally
handled their bank accounts, that the fairest way to resolve this
issue was to allow each party to simply retain the monies which
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existed in these accounts as of April 15, 1996.
ExP-60

(See ExP-4A and

- Addendum to this Brief).

Mrs.

Parker would request this Court to affirm Judge Pueler's

decision in all respects and award her all of the attorney's fees
and costs she has been required to incur in having to respond to
this appeal.
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SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
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84101-21G7
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(801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
O0o

CARLA K. PARKER,
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

Petitioner,
v.

Civil No. 95 490 4494
DALE S. PARKER,
Judge Sandra N. Peuler
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett

Respondent.
o0o
The

above-entitled

numerous

days

Honorable

in

Sandra

July,
N.

matter
August

Peuler,

Petitioner appearing

came
and

Judge

of

on

regularly

October,
the

for

1997,

trial

before

above-entitled

on
the

Court,

in person and by and through her attorney,

Sharon A. Donovan, and Respondent appearing in person and by and
through

his

attorney,

Kellie

F. Williams, and

the Court

having

heard testimony of the parties and of their witnesses, having heard
oral arguments of counsel and having further reviewed the pleadings
and exhibits

filed in this matter, and having taken this matter

under advisement and having issued a written Minute Entry now makes
and enters the following:
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A

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

above-entitled

matter

was

bifurcated,

with

that

Decree of Divorce having been entered by the Court on April 15,
1996.
2.

The parties entered into a stipulation resolving numerous

issues prior to the trial, outlined below.
3.

Custody.

The parties stipulated that Petitioner should

be awarded custody of the parties' minor child, to-wit: Bryan, age
17,

born

on

April

2,

1980, subject

to

reasonable

rights

of

visitation on behalf of Respondent.
4.

Child Support.

Child support should be paid in the sum

of $322.00 per month until Bryan reaches the age of eighteen and
graduates from high school in his expected year of graduation.

The

Court heard testimony concerning the minor child's tutoring costs.
The Court finds there should be no Order requiring Respondent to
pay one-half of the tutoring costs, unless he voluntarily wishes to
assist his child.
5.

Health Insurance.

The parties agree that they should

each maintain health and accident insurance on behalf of Bryan and
share

equally

expenses

the premium

and

non-covered

medical

and

dental

for Bryan, until he reaches the age of eighteen and

graduates from high school in his expected senior year.
6.

Life Insurance. The parties agree that each party should

maintain life insurance policies on their lives in the sum of
$50,000.00, with Bryan named as sole and exclusive
2
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*\

beneficiary

thereon, until he reaches the age of eighteen and graduates from
high school in his expected senior year.
7.

Attorney's

Fees.

Each

party

should

pay

their

own

attorney's fees and Court costs incurred herein.
8.

Appraisal Costs.

The Court previously ruled that all

appraisal costs will be equalized between the parties.

The Court

heard testimony that Petitioner has incurred appraisal costs of
$2,500.00,

and

$1,975.00.

These costs should be equalized and Respondent should

pay

to

Respondent

Petitioner

the

sum

has

of

incurred

$262.50.

appraisal

The

costs

parties

of

further

stipulated that while they did not necessarily stipulate to the
values of the real properties, as set forth in the appraisals, all
of the appraisals in this matter on the real properties could come
in as evidence, without the necessity of appraisers testifying.
9.

Income Withholding.

The parties agreed that good cause

exists not to require immediate income withholding of Respondent's
child support obligation.

As long as Respondent remains timely in

the payment of child support, it is in the child's best interests
for child support to be paid directly to Petitioner.

In the event

Respondent becomes delinquent in payment of the child support,
automatic income withholding should be implemented, pursuant to
statute.
10.

Restoration of Maiden Name.

to her maiden name and known as

Petitioner may be restored

"Carla Sue Kelly.
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Petitioner may continue to use the name of Carla Parker in her
business dealings.
11.

Furniture and Furnishings. The furniture and furnishings

should be equitably divided by the Court, as outlined below in
paragraph 24 (i), with Petitioner being awarded the painting from
her sister and a reasonable amount of copies of the children's
pictures.

The parties stipulated that Petitioner has received the

framed picture of her mother and dad.

The parties agreed that

Respondent should be awarded the parrot, "Shorty."

Respondent

shall be awarded his genealogy books and yearbook.
12.

Debts.

Each party should be ordered to pay their own

debts and obligations, including business obligations and hold the
other harmless from any obligation thereon.
13.

Alimony.

Both parties are capable of employment and no

alimony should be awarded to either party.
14.

Restraining Order.

There should be a mutual Restraining

Order from harming, harassing or bothering the other or incurring
any obligations against the other.
15.

The

Court

heard

numerous

testimony

concerning

the

remaining contested issues of property division and other related
issues.

The Court further finds that during the course of the

trial, the Respondent withdrew his Objection to the Protective
Order and the Court finds that the Protective Order entered in this
matter under Civil No. 954904494 shall be consolidated with this
action and become a part of the final Order.
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16.

Valuation of Marital Assets.

The Court previously

ordered that the date of the bifurcated divorce, April 15, 1996, is
the date of valuation of the marital assets.
17.

Real Property.

The Court finds that it is reasonable to

divide the real property acquired by the parties in the following
manner:
(a) Petitioner' s Home.

The home at 1772 Dove Hollow

Circle, which was valued at $280,000 as of April 15, 1996, should
be awarded to Petitioner, subject to the debt thereon.

The

mortgage balance as of the same date was the sum of $202,541.28.
The equity, therefore, belonging to both parties as of that date is
the sum of $77,459.00.
Respondent.

One-half of equity is to be credited to

The promissory note (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) in the

sum of $50,000.00 which was prepared by the Petitioner is not
included as a debt against the home for purposes of division of
marital property or debts. The evidence received during the course
of the trial is that the Petitioner prepared it in favor of Kevin
Gates, that Kevin Gates did not intend to ask her for the money
unless he "needs" it at some point in the future, that Petitioner
told Respondent she was given the lot by Gates, and that she did
not have to pay her one-half share.

Based upon all of that

evidence, the Court finds that it is not a debt that Petitioner is
obligated to pay, and the value of the home equity should not be
reduced accordingly.
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(b) Duplex.

i

The duplex at 2214 W, Bonniebrook Drive is

a marital asset, and is valued at $140,000.00, less a mortgage
balance

of

$74,267.00.

The duplex

is awarded

to Petitioner,

subject to the debt.

The parties' equity in the duplex is in the

sum

one-half

of

$65,733.00;

of

this

is

to

be

credited

to

Respondent.
Petitioner has collected rental income from the duplex
during the parties' separation.

In addition, during that period,

she has maintained the home and paid the mortgage payments on it,
although the parties jointly cared for the duplex prior to their
separation.

Petitioner should be awarded the net proceeds from the

duplex that she collected as rental income during the separation,
without any contribution of those sums to Respondent, in part,
because of the payments that she has made.

In addition, any rental

income that Petitioner received for this duplex will act as an
offset to her claim against Respondent for the rental value of the
residence that he occupied during that same period of separation.
(c) Denver Street Property.

The home located at 1070

Denver Street is a marital asset in which the parties jointly have
a one-half interest, together with their son. Respondent testified
in connection with this home that he and Petitioner discussed the
purchase as a residence for their sons while the sons attended
college.

Petitioner

testified

that

she has

depreciated

that

property on her income taxes every year, that she collects rental
6
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funds from her son, and that she further subsidizes the mortgage
payment.

Petitioner further testified that she and the parties'

son are on the title to the home, as well as the loan.

The

parties, it appears, have treated the property as their property,
including receiving the tax benefits of ownership.

The Court

finds, based upon that evidence, that the property is a marital
asset to the extent of the parties' one-half interest. Although no
appraisal was performed, Respondent's estimated value was the sum
of $110,000.00 and no evidence to the contrary was received. Based
upon the mortgage owed in the sum of $74,956.00, the parties
jointly have $17,522.00 in equity.

Petitioner should be awarded

the parties' interest in that home, with each party awarded onehalf of the equity.

Respondent should receive credit for his

share.
(d) Spokane Property.

Lot 7, River Bluff Estates in

Spokane, Washington, is marital property which, at the time of
trial, was listed for sale.

The Court ordered that the property

continue to be listed for sale until sold, with Petitioner to be
responsible for maintaining the current listing. Since the time of
trial, the Washington

lot has sold and the net proceeds of

$83,914.97 were divided equally between the parties and from which
proceeds Respondent had equalized the value of the marital assets
as

set

forth

in

paragraph

26.

Petitioner

should

file

a

Satisfaction of Judgment reflecting that the property settlement
7
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has been paid.

,

Petitioner testified that she exchanged Lot 9 for

Lot 7, and that she does not own Lot 9 at this time.

The Court

finds that testimony to be credible and to be supported by
documentary evidence produced at the time of trial.

The Court,

therefore, finds that no interest exists in the parties as to Lot
9.
(e) Marital Residence. The marital residence located at
6305 South 1300 West, Murray, should be awarded to Respondent. The
value of the home is $176,000.00 and no mortgage is owed thereon.
Each party is awarded one-half of the equity in that home as of the
date of the date of the divorce Decree in the sum of $88,000.00.
Petitioner

is to receive credit

for her share.

Although a

Stipulation signed by the parties during early stages of this
lawsuit required Respondent to pay $100,000.00 as Petitioner's
share of equity, that sum was based upon both parties' erroneous
assumption regarding the value of the home.

The equity should be

divided based upon the appraisal, which was stipulated to by both
parties prior to the time of trial.
Petitioner's claim for reimbursement of the rental value
of the home during the period of separation is denied. Although it
is clear that Respondent has had the use of a home on which no
mortgage payments are owed, Petitioner received the value of rental
payments on the parties' duplex as set forth above, which she did
not share with Respondent. In addition, the financial resources of

8
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the parties

are

disparate.

Based upon

the

1996

tax

returns

(Petitioner's Exhibits 52 and 54), Petitioner has a greater ability
to pay debts.

The Court has considered their respective resources

in addition to the rental income retained by Petitioner.
(f) Lot Behind Marital Residence.
the

parties

Petitioner

have

no

testified

ownership
that

title

interest
has

The Court finds that
in

that

always

been

property.
held

by

Respondent's parents.

Although both parties testified to some

limited

lot,

usage

acquiescence

of

the

it

appears

that

it

was

with

of Respondent's parents who own the lot.

the

Leone

Parker, Respondent's mother, testified that she and her husband,
Respondent's father, own the property and has never intended to
transfer it to these parties. Based upon the evidence as set forth
above, the Court determines that there is no ownership interest in
this lot held by either of the parties.
(g) Boras Mountain View.

Lot 105, Borgs Mountain View,

is a marital asset, which is awarded to Respondent.

The Court

finds the value to be the sum of $40,000.00, based upon the sale
price of a lot close to the one in question.
for $40,000.00
street.

The lot which sold

is similar in size and is located on the same

Each party is awarded one-half of the equity value of that

lot.
(h) Almost Heaven, Kamiah, Idaho Property. Lot 10, Almost
Heaven, Kamiah, Idaho, is a marital asset, which is listed for

9
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sale.

The parties

property.

jointly

have

t

a one-half

interest

in

that

It should continue to be actively marketed for sale

until sold, with Respondent responsible to do so.

At the time of

sale, the net proceeds to which the parties are jointly entitled
are to be divided equally between them.
(i) Tahoe Ridge, Kooskia, Idaho Property.

Tahoe Ridge,

Kooskia, Idaho, is a marital asset in which the parties jointly
have a one-half interest.

The marital value of that property is

$40,087.00 and that property is awarded to Respondent.

Each party

is awarded one-half of the equity, with Petitioner to receive
appropriate credit.
18.

Disputed

Real

property are in dispute.

Property.

Several

of

the parcels

of

In connection with Respondent's business,

the parties individually or jointly would obtain properties and
Respondent would build homes.

Petitioner would sell the homes and

each party would receive income: Petitioner by way of commissions,
and Respondent by way of profit, on the sale of the homes.

Some

parcels of real property were actually owned by the parties, and
were inventory in Respondent's business.

Others were titled in

their names only to facilitate the construction loans, but the
parties actually had no ownership interest.

The title to those

parcels was simply "passed through" for purposes of effectuating
the sale to the ultimate purchaser.

As to the properties

in

dispute, the following findings are made:
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(a) The properties owned by the parties located at 5520
W. Suncliff Court; 5456 W. Banberry Court; and 5635 S, Capitol Reef
Drive were properties that were sold prior to the time that the
parties separated.

Although Petitioner testified that she received

no benefit from those funds, the Court finds that both parties, in
fact, received benefits, either by way of debt payment or purchase
of other assets which were divided by the ruling.

Therefore, as to

these properties sold prior to the parties' separation, no division
of any proceeds is made.
(b) As to properties located at 13227 South 2990 West and
Lot 2, Dove Hollow # located at 1839 W. Dove Hollow, the Court finds
that the parties had no ownership interest in the lots themselves.
The parties never purchased or paid for these lots.

Respondent's

testimony, which is buttressed by the documents received in this
case, was that the lots were in the parties' names because of the
construction

loan Respondent

obtained.

Neither

of

these

lots,

therefore, became marital property in which the parties had any
interest.

Therefore, there are no marital proceeds which are to be

divided.
(c) As to the Ravenwood Lot at 13070 South 2980 West and
Lot 5, Dove Hollow, at 1802 W, Dove Hollow, the Court finds that
there are no marital proceeds which should be divided.

As to these

two lots, although they were sold during the parties' separation,
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the funds from the lots were used in other properties which were
owned as of the date of the divorce Decree.
(d) As to property located at 13097 South 340 West, the
property was acquired after the divorce Decree and no marital asset
exists for purpose of division.
(e) As to Lot 101, Shadow Mountain, at 5208 W, Case
Mountain Road, the value of the marital asset as of the divorce
Decree

was

the

value

of

the

lot

in

the

sum

of

$34,900.00.

Respondent has previously received any consideration paid thereon.
Petitioner should be credited one-half of the value of the equity
in this lot in the sum of $17,450.00.
(f) As to the property at 6005 Dewdrops Drive, the value
of the lot owned by the parties was $25,000.00, which was received
by Respondent.

The equity should be divided equally between the

parties in the sum of $12,500.00.

The profit derived from the

building and sale of the home by Respondent's business and the
commissions earned by Petitioner's business, are ordinary business
income to each of them and should not be included in a division of
marital assets.
As to the two properties set forth above on Dewdrops
Drive and Shadow Mountain, the parties or Respondent's business
acquired them for the purpose of business inventory.

The value of

the real property is part of the value of Respondent's business,
which the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to share.
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19.

Parties1

Respective

Businesses.

The

Court

heard

testimony concerning the parties' respective businesses acquired
during the course of this marriage.

Petitioner is a real estate

broker and has ownership interests in R Brokers Partnership which
represents Petitioner's one-sixth share in the building located at
150 East Vine Street; one-sixth interest in Realty Broker's Service
Corp. and an interest in the fixed assets and equipment of Realty
Broker's performance. The Court further finds that Respondent has
an interest in Aspen View Homes and has been a builder during the
course of this marriage.
As to the business interests of the parties, the Court finds
that although each party operated his or her own business, the
parties

used

enterprises.

their

joint

efforts

to

support

the

other's

Petitioner and Respondent both testified that they

purchased real property in their joint names.

Petitioner, as a

realtor, would pre-sell a home, and Respondent, as a builder, would
construct the home. Although they had separate business accounts,
Petitioner testified that they frequently borrowed money from each
other, and each had writing privileges on most of the other's
accounts.

The parties transferred funds into a joint bank account

for purposes of paying marital bills, and the parties filed joint
tax returns until the separation.

Although Petitioner testified

that Respondent never encouraged her or helped with her business,
it appears based upon the above facts that the parties acted in
concert with each other, provided mutual support, pooled financial
13
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resources, made joint payments on marital debt, and received
financial benefit from the interaction.

Based upon that, each

party should be awarded his or her own business, with the other
party to receive credit for one-half of the value of that business.
As to Petitioner, her business has the following values, which
were stipulated to by the parties: the Realty Broker's performance
equipment - $950.00; Realty Broker's Service Corporation equipment
- $1,592.00; the building located at 150 East Vine Street $33,425.00; Petitioner's business value is the sum of $35,967.00
and Respondent should receive credit for one half of that sum.
As to Respondent, his business value is as follows: Aspen View
Homes equipment - $3,375.00. Respondent's business also has value
in the real property held as inventory at the time the parties were
divorced, and the Petitioner is awarded one-half equity as set
forth above.
20.

Bank Accounts.

As to the parties' bank accounts, the

Court finds as follows: The parties were separated for several
months prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

During that

time, each party operated his or her business, derived income
therefrom, paid debts and supported him or herself.

Both parties

testified that some bank accounts were business accounts only,
while others were used for both personal and business purposes.
Both parties also testified that business expenses were paid from
the accounts on an ongoing basis.

In addition,

Petitioner

testified that funds were frequently transferred from one account
14
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to another for both business and personal reasons.

Both parties

also testified that monies came into the bank accounts from various
sources, including ordinary business income, returns on business
investments, monies from loans or monies from gross sales or
commissions.
Monies were also paid out of the accounts for numerous
purposes.

Some funds were used for the personal support of each

party; some were paid toward business expenses or debts; some were
used to purchase real property which has been divided by this
decision; and some funds were used to pay marital debts.
Some business and personal bank accounts were commingled, and
both parties used business income for self support and payment of
marital debts. There is no specific accounting of all of the bank
accounts, however, either as to the source of deposits or nature of
expenditures, that will allow the Court to accurately determine any
net value of the accounts to divide the same fairly.

Therefore,

the Court awards each account to the holder of the same, and makes
no valuation for purposes of the marital estate.
An

exception

to

Petitioner's possession.
in the future.

that

exists

in

the

bond

accounts

in

She may receive a portion of those funds

Respondent should be awarded one-half of the net

funds that Petitioner receives at that time. These funds represent
a return on the investment made by Petitioner's business during the
time the parties were married, and should be divided accordingly.
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21.

Murray Parkway.

The Murray Parkway Associates property

should be awarded to Petitioner.

The testimony of both parties

established that while Petitioner has played a primary role in
developing other properties, Respondent has no similar experience.
Petitioner has been the person, as between these two parties, who
has carried out the responsibilities of planning, meeting with
officials, paying creditors and property owners on this project.
The Court received Petitioner's Exhibit 59, which represents the
numerous correspondence with the property owners, the City and
other

individuals

to

substantiate

Petitioner's

substantial

involvement with the development of Murray Parkway. The Court
further finds that Petitioner assisted Respondent's parents in
maintaining their property when it was foreclosed upon some years
ago, when it was sold to a previous buyer.

Petitioner also

assisted the Parkers in the foreclosure in advising them not to
subordinate their interests, as some of the other property owners
had, who eventually lost their properties. Given the animosity
between the parties, Respondent's request that he become involved
in the project with Petitioner is not feasible. The Court further
finds that Respondent has filed a lawsuit against Petitioner,
entitled Dale S. Parker v. Murray Parkway Associates, a Utah
Limited Liability Company, Carla K. Parker, an individual, and
Martin

W. Merrill, an individual, Civil No. 970904981.

addition,

although

the property

is

impossible to project future value.

a marital

asset,

is

The risk of profit or loss
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will remain with the Petitioner and the value of the property
should be divided as of the divorce Decree.

The value of Murray

Parkway therefore, is the sum of $115,230.00, which is the present
value.

Respondent's one-half share, which should be credited to

him, is the sum of $57,615.00.
-ite—addirtriuii,—-pursuant—fee—stipulation-;—Respondent

yhuuifcd-

immediately release the Lis Pcndcno on the Murray Parkway property
to onable PeLiLioner to continue to market the property.
22.

Vehicles.

As

to

the vehicles,

the

Court

finds

as

follows:
(a) The 1995 Lexus and the 1994 Jeep have been sold by
Petitioner. At the time of sale, Petitioner incurred no additional
debt, nor did she receive any additional value for those vehicles.
The marital estate value of both of them, therefore, is zero.
(b)

The

1990

F-250

truck

has

a

marital

value

of

$9,000.00, which is the amount Respondent charged the parties son
to whom he sold the truck.

Respondent should receive any payments

from the parties' son, and Petitioner should receive credit for
one-half of the value of the truck in the sum of $4,500.00.
(c) The 1996 Ford truck should be awarded to Respondent.
It was acquired after the divorce Decree, and no value is assessed,
based upon stipulation of the parties.
(d) The 1972 Ford truck should be awarded to Respondent.
The

value,

based

upon

Respondent's

testimony,

is
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the

sum

of

$1,000.00.

Petitioner should receive credit for one-half of that

value, in the sum of $500.00.
(e) The 1985 Ford truck should be awarded to Respondent.
The value, based upon Respondent's deposition testimony, is the sum
of $4,500.00.

Petitioner should receive credit for one-half

of

that value in the sum of $2,250.00.
(f) The 1956 Ford truck is awarded to Respondent.

The

value, based upon Petitioner's testimony, is the sum of $1,000.00.
Petitioner should receive credit for one-half of that value in the
sum of $500.00.
(g) The motor home, boat and hot tub should all be sold,
and

net

proceeds

divided

equally.

The

party

currently

in

possession of the particular asset should take steps to list and
market the item for sale.
(h) The tool

trailer should be awarded to Respondent.

Respondent testified that he paid $800.00 for it, and that it is a
1977 single axle trailer.

The Court finds the value to be $500.00,

consistent with Respondent's testimony.

One-half of that value, in

the sum of $250.00, should be credited to Petitioner.
23.

Houseboat.

The

houseboat

held

in

the

name

of

Total

Surprise, LLC, should be awarded equally to the parties, with each
of them to receive a value in the sum of $20,000.00, based upon
their stipulation.
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24.

Personal Property.

The parties should be awarded other

items of personal property, as follows:
(a) Respondent should be awarded the guns and ammunition
in his possession, which are valued in the total sum of $3,775.00,
based upon Respondent's Exhibit 10.
(b) Respondent should be awarded the gold and silver
pieces in this possession which are valued at $23,380.00. Although
Petitioner testified that she believed it had a higher value, there
was no substantive evidence to corroborate her testimony.

There

was also no other evidenced to support Respondent's claim that
Petitioner had kept some of his coins.

Therefore, the gold and

silver are valued as set forth on Respondent's Exhibit 10 in the
sum as set forth above.
(c)

The

tools

and

equipment

in

the

garage,

and

compressors are awarded to Respondent and the value is set on those
items in the sum of $3,000.00. The Court finds that both parties
placed

disparate

values on the

items they each received.

The

Respondent valued the tools at less than $2,000.00. The Petitioner
valued the tools at $3,000.00, and the compressors at an additional
sum.

It appears that, taking both values into account, that a

reasonable value for both tools and compressors is the sum as set
forth above.
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(d)

The

camping

equipment

is

to

k

be

divided

equally

between the parties.
(e) As to the ski equipment, each party is awarded one
set of skis, Respondent

to be awarded the remainder of the

equipment, which is valued in the sum of $400.00.

ski

The value

based upon an assessment of both parties' testimony as to

is

their

value.
(f) As to the marine radios, each party is awarded one.
(g) As to the Satellite dish and receivers, both items
are to be sold and any amount of profits divided equally between
the parties.

The items are in the Respondent's possession and he

is directed to seek a sale on them.
(h)

The

Petitioner

should

be

awarded

the

jewelry

currently in her possession.

The Court finds the total value in

the

portion,

sum

of

$7,150.00.

A

$5,150.00

set

forth

in

Petitioner's Exhibit 46, is based upon an appraisal done on four
rings in her possession.

Although the Respondent used a higher

value, the Court finds as to these items, that it is appropriate to
use this valuation, as opposed to the replacement value utilized by
Respondent.

The other $2,000.00 value, as set

forth above,

is

miscellaneous jewelry itemized on Petitioner's Exhibit 4.
(i) Each party is awarded the furniture and furnishings
currently

in his or her possession.

The Court

finds that

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

each

testified that he or she had furniture of little value, while the
other party had furniture of substantially greater value.

The

Court finds, based upon the itemized lists of furniture provided by
each party, each party has furniture and furnishings that are of
substantially the same value. Therefore, the Court finds that each
has the same amount of property in terms of value.
25.

Tax

Deduction.

The

Court

finds,

based

upon

the

difference in the parties' respective incomes and the amount of
child support, Petitioner should be awarded the child for purposes
of the tax exemption.
26.

Overcharges.

Petitioner

claims

that

there

were

overcharges on her residence from Respondent's Other Projects, and
that those were charged inappropriately to her home.

Respondent

testified and provided some documentary evidence otherwise.

The

Court finds that there is no evidence that Respondent made any
inappropriate charges against Petitioner's home and, therefore,
denies Petitioner's request.
27.

Life

Insurance

and

Retirement

Plans.

As

to

life

insurance and retirement plans, Respondent should be awarded the
Jackson National Life Insurance policy, which has a cash value of
$2,879.00.
Policy

in

Respondent is also awarded the Surety Life Retirement
the

sum of

$18,131.00.

Petitioner

is awarded

the

Prudential Securities SEP-IRA, which has a value of $63,706.00.
28.

Value of Marital Assets. Based upon the above, the total

value of marital assets to be divided between the parties is
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$809,694.00.

By this ruling, the Petitioner has received assets

valued at $402,767.00, and Respondent has received assets valued at
$406,927.00.

The parties also have other assets which are to be

divided equally after sale, as set forth above.

Respondent is

ordered to pay Petitioner the sum of $2,080.00 to equalize the
asset division, which sum is to be paid from proceeds of the sale
of one of those assets.
29.
30.

Aristocrat Travel. The parties are each awarded one-half

of any restitution which may be received in the future from the
Aristocrat Travel cruise refund.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

An Order shall be entered herein based upon the ruling of

the Court and stipulations of the parties concerning division of
the property of the parties, payment of support, payment of the
debts and obligations of the parties, and other matters, as more
specifically set forth in the foregoing Findings of Fact, and the
same should be ratified, approved and confirmed in all particulars.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That judgment be entered accordingly.
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DATED t h i s

^ 7

day of

UJXxl

if

*

, 1998

BY THE COURT:

g?Lf-i.
CC^v^C^-*

rA

£x

SANDRA N. PEULER
district Court Jud<

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

By
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Respondent

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the Q/i^

day of February, 1998, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Kellie F. Williams
Attorney at Law
Corporon & Williams
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake Cit/, Utah 84102
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PROPOSAL "B"--AMENDED

^ A l ^ S T A T E LEGAL SUPPLY CO

PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
CARLA AND DALE PARKER
DALE

CARLA

Real property
^ouse at 1772 Dove Hollow Circle, SLC
(Webber appraisal $280,000 less mortgages $252,541)

$27,459

2

2214 W. Bonnie Brook Dr. (Duplex)
(Webber appraisal $140,000 less $74,267 mortgage)

65,733

1070 Denver Street (son's home)
3

Lot 7 River Bluff Estates, Spokane, WA (Carla)

60,000

4

House at 6305 South 1300 West, Murray
$176,000
(Webber appraisal $176,000; owned clear)
[See Partial Stipulation and Order re Home Equity]

5
6

Lot behind house

75,000

Lot 105 Borgs Mountain View

50,000

Lot 10 Almost Heaven, Kamiah, ID (10 acres)
(Stroble appraisal $29,300; owned clear
— D a l e has 1/2 interest)

14,650

Tahoe Ridge, Kooskia, Idaho—83 acres (Dale) (Stroble appraisal $178,400 less debt $98,226
as of 4/15/96 = equity $80,174 @ 1/2 interest)

40,087

Real Properties sold by defendant on which
plaintiff received no share of sales proceeds;
Value shown as marital property is value of lot
which parties owned clear.
5520 West Sun C l i f f

Court,

SLC (Soldio/i2/95-$94,4ii)

30,000

5456 West B r a n b u r y C o u r t ,

SLC (sold8/9/95-497,936)

3 0,000

5635 S. C a p i t o l Reef D r . ,

SLC (Sold7/20/95~$i22,793)

32,000

1839 West Dove H o l l o w C i r . ,
6005 S. Dewdrops D r . ,

SLC (sold 5/23/96~$7i,229>

SLC (Sold5/i4/96-$io2,i98)

46,000
30,000

13227 S o . 2990 W e s t , R i v e r t o n (Sold2/26/96~$n,990)

48,000

13078 S o . 2980 W e s t , R i v e r t o n (Sow2/20/96»$59,2io)

38,000
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10/22/97

1

DALE
1802 West Dove H o l l o w C i r . ,

SLC (Soid2/5/9<s-$74,i60)

CARLA

68,900

5208 W. C a s e M o u n t a i n Rd. , W . J . (sold ioy7/9<s-$8i,373)

35,000

13097 S o u t h 3040 W e s t , R i v e r t o n (Sold 4/i/97-$75,485)

36,500

Vehicles
8

1995 Lexus LS400 (Carla)
(Value $43,675 less debt $45,461 as of 3/31/96)

(1,786)

9

1994 Jeep Grand Cherokee Ltd. (Carla)
(Value $21,300 less loan $22,335)

10

1996 Ford F-350 truck

n

(1,035)
32,000

1990 F250 4x4 truck (sold to son)

9,900

12

1,000

13

4,500

14

1,000

l5

4,500

l6

18,315

l7

3,000

1972 Ford F250 truck

1985 Ford F250 truck

1956 Ford Pickup truck

1978 Motorhome

1989 SeaRay 230 Cuddy Cabin boat
Tool trailer

Business/Partnership Interests
l8

Aspen View Homes

[9

3,375

Realty B r o k e r s Performance
Fixed assets/equipment

950

-°Realty B r o k e r s S e r v i c e C o r p .
F i x e d assets/equipment—carta's i/6 share of $9,554

1,592

ll

R Brokers Partnership
Building 150 E. Vine—Webber appraisal $258,000 less
mortgage $57,450 = $200,550 @ 1/6 share

Murray Park Associates
(Webber appraisal $1,072,800 less debt $842,340
= equity $230,460; Caria's 50% interest
-2Total Surprise LLC
1992 56' Houseboat—1/6 share each

(incl wavcrunners)

33,425

115,230
20,000
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20,000

DALE

CARLA

Life Insurance
23

Jackson National Life (Cash value $2,879)

2,879

Retirement Plans
Surety Life
Prudential

SEP (stmt4/24/96)
Securities

18,131
SEP (stmt3/31/96)

63,706

Bank Accounts
Cyprus CU #74823 (Parker Enterprises)
Share account (3/3i/96-$3o.3i)
Sharedraft checking (3/3i/96-$59.42)

30
59

Cyprus CU #6591 (joint checking)

?

Cyprus CU 50830, (Carla savings)
Share account (4/8/96-$3,829.98)

3,830

Cyprus CU #96770 (Dale, checking) (4/15/96)
Share account (4/i5/96~$5o.27)
Sharedraft checking (4/i5/96~$n,446.91)
Cyprus CU #57172 (Aspen View Homes)
Share account (4/is/96~$5i.26)
Sharedraft checking (4/i5/96-$237.20)

50
11,447
'

51
237

_

Zions Bank #17370586, Carla checking (4/12/96$99.80)

100

First Interstate #21042197
(Realty Brokers Performance) (4/i5/96-$io,o89.84)
Key Bank # 4 4 0 6 9 0 0 0 2 7 7 7
First

Interstate

(Sunrise Flats)

Bank # 2 1 1 8 6 4 1 6

10,090
(3/31/96 $75o.i9-noactivity April)

(Dove H o l l o w )

(4/i/96~$6289.74)

Miscellaneous
Guns (Gallenson appraisal)

2,555

Additional guns, ammunition and reloading equipment
not produced for appraisal (see photographs)
24

Gold

25

?

50,000

Silver

10,000
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750
6,290

DALE

CARLA

26

Jewelry (excluding gifts and wedding ring)

$2,750

^Yard tools and equipment in garage

3,000

^Compressors, ski equipment, camp equipment

2,000

(CarU would like one-half of camping equipment and coolers)

Marine radios (2)—one to each

300

Hot tub

6,000

Satellite dish and receivers

2,400

Furniture and furnishings left in home when
parties separated—see list

3 00

18,000

Living room, dining room and family room
furniture taken by Carla (duplicates same left
with Dale)

2,000

29

Rent value of living in marital residence
since separation—21 months @$1,000

21,000

^Overcharges against plaintiff's Dove Hollow
residence from defendant's other projects
charged to plaintiff's construction loan

30,000

Aristocrat Travel Cruise Restitution—
if and when received, to be divided equally
TOTAL VALUES

(30,000)

1/2

1/2

"$1,025/777

$381,473

Property settlement from defendant to
plaintiff to equalize values

(322,152)

KET DISTRIBUTION

$703,625
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322,152
$703,625

Explanatory notes:
1.

First mortgage $2 02,541 as of 4/96 plus Kevin Gates1 note
$50,000.

2.

Mortgage balance as of 4/96.

3.

Carla's estimate of value.

4.

Value at $225,000 is Carla's estimate of value.

5.

Carla's estimate of value.

6.

Carla's estimate of value based on comparable sales; owned
clear.

7.

Int. Ans. 10. According to deposition p. 2 6-27 all vehicles
are owned free and clear and are titled in his individual
name, not in Aspen View Homes.

8.

Value is NADA Average trade-in value as of 4/96 when parties
divorced; loan is balance as of 3/31/96.

9.

Value is NADA Average trade-in value as of 4/96 when parties
were divorced; loan is also as of 4/96.

10.

Deposition p. 24.

11.

Value from Int. Ans. Deposition p. 24 says sold truck to
son and has not received any money for it.

12.

Deposition p. 24.
$1,000.

13.

Deposition p. 25.

14.

Value is Carla's estimate.

15.

Carla's estimate of value.

16.

Value is per Duce Marine quote.

17.

Carla's estimate of value based on comparables in newspaper.

18.

Defendant's Financial Declaration values equipment at
$3,375.

19.

Value of fixed assets from Personal Property Affidavit filed
with Salt Lake County Assessor.

20.

Equipment per Personal Property Affidavit filed with County.

21.

Mortgage balance as of 4/96.

22.

Digitized by the Howard
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law two
School, BYU.
Carla's estimate
of W.value.
Parties
own
1/6 shares.

Sold truck to guy across the street for
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23.

Int. Ans. 11.

24.

Plaintiff's estimate. Defendant has told other people he
has anywhere from $25,000 to $200,000 in gold.

25.

Plaintiff's estimate of value.

26.

Philip &. Co. jewelry appraisal excluding value of wedding
ring (#4 on appraisal).

27.

Plaintiff's estimate of value.

28.

Plaintiff's estimate of value.

29.

See letter from Verlinda Roberts stating rental value of
home at $1995 per month.

30.

See written statement of Travis Parker.
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JERRY R. WEBBER, MAI
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER and CONSULTANT

June 10, 1996
Carla K. Parker
1772 West Dove Hollow
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Dear Ms. Parker:
In accordance with your recent request, I submit the following appraisal report on the
property known as Murray Parkway subdivision, located at about 6200 South 1200 West, Murray
City, Utah. The property is comprised of land containing a total of 33.52487 acres. The property
has no improvements of contributory value.
The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the market value of the fee simple interest in
the property. The estimate of value is based on an AS IS CONDITION of the property as of the
date of inspection. Market value, as defined for this report, is the most probable price in terms
of money which a property should bring in the competitive and open market under all conditions
requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and assuming
the price is not affected by undue stimulus.
The accompanying complete appraisal, which follows, describes my method and contains
data gathered in my investigation. My analysis, opinions and conclusions are based upon the facts
presented in the report.
After careful consideration and analysis, I am of the opinion that the MARKET VALUE
of the land and improvements, in an AS IS CONDITION, as of May 29, 1996 is:
ONE MILLION SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NO/100
($1,072,800.00) DOLLARS
I trust this report is sufficient for the purposes intended.
^-Respectfully Submitted,

Jerry K. Webber
Utah State Certified General Appraiser
License Number CG00037024

JRW/sm
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Summary of mportant Conclusions
6200 South 1200 West

Location:

Murray City, Utah
Purpose of Appraisal:

Estimate Value of the Fee Estate

Effective Date of Value:

May 29, 1996

Date of Report:

June 5, 1996

Title Holder:

James R. Parker
Douglas A. and Leone S. Parker
Udell G. and Elizabeth M. Parker

Lot Size:
Total Property:

33.5247 acres in three parcels

Taxes:

$ 25.55 paid for 1995, entire parcel

Flood Plain:

part in 100 year flood, panel 490103-0002C

Zoning:

R-1-10, single family dwellings, Murray City
10,000 square foot minimum lot size
none of contributory value

Improvements:
Highest and Best Use:

single family development

Vacant:

$1,072,800

Estimated Land Value:
Cost Approach:

, i

not applicable

Income Approach:

not applicable

Sales Comparison Approach:

for land only

Estimated Final Value, As Is:

$ 1,072,800

Estimated Market Exposure:

4 - 6 months
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( 6200 South 1200 West)
Purpose of Appraisal
The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the "Market Value" of the following described
property located at the above captioned site as of May 29, 1996. The rights included in the
estimation of value are based on fee simple ownership, unless otherwise noted in the body of this
report. Fee simple title the pure and unencumbered ownership in real property. The primary
limitations on this form of ownership are controlled by the government for the benefit of society
as a whole, or private restrictions that are entered into by individuals. These limitations are
generally in the areas of public health, taxes, eminent domain, easements and rights of way.

Function of Report
The function of this report is to aid the client in making decisions relating to the property.
This property is part of a martial estate. The applicant has requested the appraiser estimate the
market value of the entire site as of the date of inspection.
Scope of Appraisal
An appraisal is an estimate of value based upon comparison of a property to other
properties. As such, appraisal is not an exact science, but an art. The appraiser interprets market
data in much the same way a well informed buyer and seller do. As part of this appraisal, the
appraiser conducted a number of independent investigations and analyses. He relied on data
retained in his office files, which are continuously and regularly updated. The investigations
undertaken and the major sources used in this report are listed below.
The appraiser examined published data of the State of Utah and local authorities for
demographic data, land use policies and trends, growth forecasts, employment data and forecasts
and construction data and forecasts. Data published by the Utah Office of Planning and Budget,
Utah Department of Employment Security, Utah Department of Community and Economic
Development, Utah State Tax Commission, Utah Energy Office and the University of Utah,
Bureau of Economic and Business Research were utilized as they affected similar properties as that
under appraisal.
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( 6200 South 1200 West)
Data published by local real estate brokers and consultants was also considered in the
economic rental, vacancy and typical expenses for this type of property use. The data considered
was also personally verified by the appraiser during the completion of this assignment. The extent
of the work and the size of the report are intended to by appropriate in relation to the significance
of the appraisal problem.
The appraiser physically inspected the property on various occasions. The most recent
being May 29, 1996. Photographs utilized in this report to depict the property were taken by the
appraiser during these inspections. There are no improvements of contributory value on the site
as of the date of inspection.
The site was compared to other sites in the area that have recently sold, or are currently
offered for sale. The sales were personally confirmed by the appraiser with the buyer, seller or
agent involved in the transaction. Each sale was personally inspected by the appraiser.
Utah is not a disclosure state, and as such data on each sale or lease is not public
information. When a property sells, buyers and sellers are not required to disclose details of the
exchange to any person or governmental authority. Comparable sales information is generally
obtained from Multiple Listing Services (MLS), or,other sources. The appraiser has attempted
to verify all pertinent information. The data contained in-this report and the appraisers files is
deemed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. Expenditure of the time and expense necessary to
provide unimpeachable verification of all facts is beyond the scope of this appraisal.
Competency of the Appraiser
The appraiser has completed assignments of similar land in the Salt Lake Metropolitan
Area. His experience is such that the completion of this report can be completed in compliance
and to conform with the competency provisions as adopted by the Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers and The Appraisal Foundation.

Date of Report
This estimate of value report was completed by the appraiser June 5, 1996. The effective
date of value is May 29, 1996, the date last physical inspection of the site.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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( 6200 South 1200 West)
Type of Appraisal Report
This is a Restricted Appraisal Report, which is intended to comply with reporting
requirements set forth under Standards Rule 2-2 ( c ) of the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice for a Restricted Report. As such, it presents limited discussion of the data,
reasoning, and analysis that were uses in the appraisal process to develop the appraiser's opinion of
value. Supporting documentation concerning the data, reasoning, and analysis is retained in the
appraiser's file. The depth of discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client
and for the intended use stated below. The appraiser is not responsible for the unauthorized use of
this report.

Uniform Appraisal Standards
This report is prepared in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice as adopted by the Institute of Real Estate Appraisers and the Appraisal Foundation. The
appraisers is a certified general appraiser in the State of Utah, and has completed all requirements
to continue in this status until June 30, 1997. This appraisal may not be used in a federally related
financial transaction and is subject to the requirements of Title XI of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989.
Definition of Market Value
Market Value as used in this report is defined as follows:
The most probable price in terms of money, which a property should bring in a competitive and
open market, under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting
prudently, knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.
Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the
passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
1. buyer and seller are typically motivated.
2. both parties are well informed or well advised, and each acting in what they consider
their own best interest.
3. a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.
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( 6200 South 1200 West)
4. payment is made in terms of cash in United States Dollars or in terms of financial
arrangements comparable thereto.
5. the price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special
or creative financing concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale.1

Legal Description
Three parcels of land containing a total of 33.5247 acres of land in the following described
parcels.
Parcel A. 0.44 acres in the following
Beginning at a point on the East Bank of the North Jordan Canal, said point being
South 883.46 feet and East 507.66 feet from the Northwest corner of Section 23,
Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence North 89°54'14" East 1395.21 feet along an existing fence line to the West
bank of the Jordan River; thence South 23 °53' 14" West 1083.42 feet; thence North
87°02'59" West 862.48 feet along an existing fence line and the extension of said
fence line to the East Bank of the North Jordan Canal; thence along said canal the
following courses, North 22°22,49" East 195.96 feet; thence North 37° 14'38" East
128.08 feet; thence North 19°38'17" East 57.52 feet; thence North l°ll'57 n West
37.48 feet; thence North 16°00'49" West 345.60 feet; thence North 46°29 f ir
West 174.15 feet; thence North 46°29'03" West 33.28 feet; thence North
12o02'00" West 96.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel B. 19.938 acres in the following
Beginning South 263.999 feet and East 646.588 feet from the Northwest corner of
Section 23, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; East
260.915 feet; North 85° East 1094.144 feet to the West Bank of Jordan River;
South 04°27'02" West 74.946 feet; South 02°52'0" East 220.63 feet; South
0°29'46" East 214.0847 feet; South 25°36'52" West 235.472 feet; South
89°54' 14" West 1395.206 feet to the East Bank of the North Jordan Canal; North
12°02' West 138.311 feet; North 05°08'28" East 84.136 feet; North 34°59'01"
East 168.055 feet; North 24°24'12" East 164.009 feet; North 04°26'20" East
83.111 feet; North 14°18'11" West 41.776 feet to beginning.

1

Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Insurance Regulations 563.17-la and 571.1b. adopted December 21T 1987,
with the simultaneous withdrawal of FHLBB Memorandum R-41-c, effective January 7, 1988. Also as defined in
Rules and Regulations, Federal Register. Volume 55, Number 165, page 34696 as of Friday, August 24, 1990.
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( 6200 South 1200 West)
Parcel C. 13.1467 acres in the following
Beginning South 883.46 feet and East 507.66 feet from Northwest corner of
Section 23, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; North
89°54'14" East 1289.773 feet; South 25° West 104.574 feet; Southerly along a
curve to the left 38.363 feet; South 18° West 461.575 feet; Southwesterly along a
curve to the right 106.814 feet; South 63° West 312.027 feet; Westerly along a
curve to the right 52.659 feet; South 86°35'55" West 54.861 feet; Southerly along
a curve to the right 160.634 feet; South 18°45' West 15.371 feet; North 87°02,59"
West 512.826 feet; North 22°22'49" East 195.96 feet; North 37°14'38" East
128.077 feet; North 19°38'17" East 57.522 feet; North 1°11'57" West 37.476
feet; North 16°00'49" West 345.597 feet; North 46°29,11" West 174.161 feet;
North 46o29'03" West 33.28 feet; North 12°02' West 96.18 feet to beginning.
Contains 19.05 acres more of less.
Title Holder
According to the ownership records of Salt Lake County, title to the property is currently
in the name of James R. Parker, Douglas A. and Leone S. Parker and Udell G. and Elizabeth M.
Parker. Carla K. Parker, a partner in the Murray Parkway Associates, LLC reports the property
has been under contract to sell for $30,000 per acre. The agreement is between Ms. Parker and
the owner for parts of the above described properties.

Marketing Time
The property is primarily comprised of vacant land. During the past 36 months sales of
1 acre or larger parcels have been very active. This activity is a result of the large amount of
speculative building taking place in Salt Lake County. For the past 18 months residential building
activity has been very brisk. For the first quarter of 1996, 1,335 permits were issued for single
family units in Salt Lake County, many in Murray, Riverton, South Jordan and West Jordan. For
all of 1995, 4,909 permits were issued for single family dwellings. For 1994, 4,447 permits were
issued for single family dwellings, for 1993 4,510 permits were issued. During 1992, 3,831
building permits were issued for single family dwellings in Salt Lake County, for 1991 3,200
permits were issued and for 1990 2,178 single family dwelling permits were issued. This large
increase in building activity has had a positive impact on the resale of acreage in most areas of Salt
Lake County. The appraiser has also discussed the land market and residential development
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 6

( 6200 South 1200 West)
market with developers and real estate agents and been informed that little available development
land has resulted in a very tight market. Estimate market exposure for this 1.50 + acres of land
is less than 6 months.
The Salt Lake Board of Realtors Multiple Listing service compiles data relating to resales
of existing homes in all areas of Salt Lake. For 1995, 1,062 homes were offered for sale in this
area, with 547 sold. For 1994, 874 homes were offered for sale with 529 sold. Average sales
price for 1995 was $135,480. The ratio of sold properties to available equates to over 50 % of
available properties sell during a 6 month listing period. This data clearly indicates a firming up
of the residential market.
Tax Data
The Salt Lake County Assessor identifies parcel B as tax parcel number 21-23-102-006.
The property was assessed for tax purposes as agricultural land. Estimated land value, was
$1,080. Taxes for 1995 were paid in the amount of $13.59.
The Salt Lake County Assessor identifies parcel C as tax parcel number 21-23-102-010.
The property was assessed for tax purposes as agricultural land. Estimated land value, was $950.
Taxes for 1995 were paid in the amount of $11.96.
Each of the properties is assessed as greenbelt land. This assessment method results in
significant reductions in assessed value, and as a result a large reduction in tax liability. Greenbelt
classification must be requested by the property owners. The owner must satisfy the assess that
the property is being put to an agricultural use, and is producing agricultural products or grazing
of livestock. If the property is found to not comply with greenbelt provisions due to an audit,
change in use or transfer of ownership, the tax savings for the most recent 5 years, as a result of
the greenbelt classification, must be repaid to the county. If the property has been classified as
greenbelt for less than 5 years, only the savings for the period of time the property was classified
as greenbelt must be paid. These renumerations as a result of the change from greenbelt to other
use can amount to a significant amount of money for the maximum term of 5 years. The
agreement between Carla Parker and the sellers of the property is that the sellers pay all greenbelt
renumerations.
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Taxes in the Salt Lake County are on an ad valorem basis. By statute of the State of Utah
the assessor of each county must estimate the Market Value of each parcel of property. This
estimate of Market Value is statutorily reduced by 20% to cover sales costs, points, discounts and
commissions. The resulting 80% of Market Value is assessed value for commercial property.
Residential property is statutorily reduced by the 20% for sales costs, and an additional 20% for
a homestead exemption. Assessed value for commercial property thus becomes 80% of the
estimated market value and assessed value for single family residential property is 60% of
estimated market value.
As a result of a tax appeal involving State Assessed Property, the rollback of estimated
market value has been altered for 1991. For 1991 assessed value for residential property is 95%
of estimated market value and 67% for residential property. The percentage of rollback is
adjusted each year based on the accuracy of each county assessor compared to State Assessed
property.
For tax year 1995 and 1994, commercial property received no reduction in value from
estimated market value to taxable value. In effect commercial property taxable value was 100% of
the assessors estimate of market value. For residential property, the reduction from market value to
assessed value was 32%.
As is typical in mass appraisal programs, property usually has an estimated market value
less than true market value. Property owners who are over assessed usually appeal the assessor's
opinion of value. Property owners who have property under assessed do not usually appeal. In
past years the appraiser has found little correlation between assessed value and market value.
It is also common for property to be over assessed. If the property is over assessed, the
owner must appeal the estimate of value during the period of time the board of equalization meets.
In Salt Lake county this is usually during the month of August of each year. The burden of proof
of the inaccuracy is on the property owner. A recent purchase of the property, with evidence of
price paid, is usually sufficient evidence of an over assessment. If the property has been owned
by the current owner for a long period of time, the property owner must furnish the board of
equalization proof in the form of comparable sales. In some cases the property owner may provide
the board of equalization a full appraisal of their property. If the board of equalization does not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reduce the assessment as a result of the appeal, the property owner may appeal to the State Tax
Commission.
The adjusted assessed value is multiplied by a tax rate to compute taxes. The tax rates are
set by various taxing districts. This property has taxes set by the Murray School District, Salt
Lake County General Fund, Salt Lake County Bond Interest, Salt Lake County Flood Control, Salt
Lake County Health, Murray City Library, Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, South
Salt Lake County Mosquito Abatement District, Central Utah Water District and Murray City
funds for police, fire and zoning enforcement. The tax rate for this property was .0125860 for
1995. The tax rate as a percentage of estimated market value is 0.0125860 or 1.26 %.
This property appears to be comparably assessed in comparison to other property in the
area. If the property were sold, it is unlikely that a sale for more than current assessor's market
value would result in an increase in taxes.
City and Area Data
Subject property is located about 9 lA miles southwest of the center of downtown Salt Lake
City. The property is located in Murray City, one of the many incorporated and unincorporated
areas making up the Greater Salt Lake metropolitan Area. -The southern quadrant of the Greater
Salt Lake Metropolitan Area is primarily comprised of bedroom communities, local shopping and
industrial uses.
The Salt Lake Metropolitan area contains about 64% of the 1990 census population of
1,722,850 people in the State of Utah. The population of Utah increased about 37.9% between
1970 and 1980 and 17.9% between 1980 and 1990. The Salt Lake Metropolitan area had a
population increase of 13.1 % between 1980 and 1987. Population increase from 1980 to 1990 was
17.3%. This population growth is tenth highest in the United States for 1990, and is primarily
from natural increases (births less deaths). The urban areas lie in the four counties (Utah, Salt
Lake, Davis, and Weber) of the Wasatch Front. This area accounts for 76% of the state
population and 5% of the land area. The Incorporated Salt Lake City area has had a population
decrease steadily since 1970. This decrease in population is caused by conversions of older
residential properties to business uses. The population has been shifted to bedroom communities
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 9

( 6200 South 1200 West)
to the south of the city. The following page shows the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, with subject
property noted.
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Area Map
The enclosed map shows the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, with subject property noted.
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The owner, applicant and appraiser are familiar with the State of Utah and Salt Lake City,
and a discussion of the regional and area data as it affects the property is deemed unnecessary for
completion of this assignment.
Neighborhood Data
The neighborhood surrounding the property is a mixed use area. There are many
residential subdivisions in the area built during the 1970's and 1980's. The neighborhood is
generally bordered on the north by 4500 South. North of this boundary uses are more newly
constructed residential oriented, with little vacant land and older residential. The east boundary
is the extension of the 1-15 freeway right of way, at about 400 West. This barrier separates the
mixed uses of the neighborhood from older residential and commercial uses east of the freeway.
The west boundary is the extension of Redwood road at about 1700 West, which separates the
mixed uses of the neighborhood from primarily newer residential uses west of Redwood Road.
The southern boundary would be considered as 7200 South, which separates mixed uses of this
neighborhood from single family residential uses and agricultural uses to the south. The major
traffic arteries are developed with retail sales and traffic oriented business. The secondary streets
are primarily residential in use, and range from single family to high density multi family.
Generally, this area has had stable growth in the past 5 years. The area is developed with
high traffic retail uses along the major roadways of 400 West, 1300 West and 1700 West. The
neighborhood is also improved with many retail strip type centers, primarily along the major
traffic arteries. There are also some wholesale sales facilities in the neighborhood.
The area is the drainage of the Jordan River. The Jordan River drains the Salt Lake Valley
from the south the northwest. It ultimately empties into the Great Salt Lake. It is the drainage
of may canyon streams, irrigation canals and other drainage in Salt Lake County. It generally
bisects the neighborhood. It has crossings at 4500 South, 4800 South, 5400 South, 6400 South
and 7800 South. The river bottom area is also developed with various walking and riding trails
that run along both sides of the river. There are also some passenger bridges that cross the river
from east to west.
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Newer development in the area has been primarily in traffic related retail sales along the
major traffic arteries. The area currently includes many small retail stores, neighborhood
shopping centers, fast food restaurants and other traffic related retail uses.
The major east to west roadways in the neighborhood are 4500 South, 4800 South, 5300
South, 6400 South and 7000 South. Each connects eastern Salt Lake County to western Salt Lake
County. The major north to south roads are 300 West, 1300 West and Redwood Road.
This area is considered an average residential area with its many single and multi family
dwellings. The area has an advantage for supply of labor as well as proximity to needed retail
facilities. Freeway access to all parts of the metro area is good with 1-215 and 1-15 having major
intersections and on and off ramps in the immediate area.
Site Data
Subject property is located about 9 lA miles southwest of the center of downtown Salt Lake
City. The property is located within the incorporated limits of Murray City. Murray City is one
of the many areas which make up the metropolitan Salt Lake City Area. The southwestern
quadrant of the metropolitan area is primarily comprised of commercial and residential uses. The
major cities are Salt Lake City, South Salt Lake City, West Valley City, Murray City and West
Jordan City. Large islands of land in the southwest quadrant are not located within one of the
incorporated cities, and fall under the jurisdiction of Salt Lake County. The area is mostly
residential with some industrial uses in the quadrant, located primarily between 2100 South and
9000 South near the 1-15 corridor. There are also some industrial uses near 2100 South and 4000
West. Most residents in this area commute to other portions of the metro area for employment.
The site about 30 feet below the grade of 1300 West, and is above the elevation of the
Jordan River, which is located west of the site. It has a general slope downwards from the west
to east. This change in elevation is typical for the area. The site is similar in topography to the
general area. The following page contains a copy of the topography map of the area.
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Topography Map
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The property is bordered on the west by the North Jordan Irrigation Canal. This canal is
used by many farmers for irrigation of crops. This canal runs along the crest of the hill that
borders the Jordan River drainage.
The property is bordered on the east by the Jordan River. Portions of the Jordan River
drainage have been developed by Murray City with public parks, wetlands and wildlife habitat.
There are many walking, jogging and bicycle paths on both sides of the drainage. Recently
Murray City developed a public golf course along the east portions of the Jordan Rive drainage,
just east of the property. West Jordan is in the process of developing various walking paths, parks
and wildlife habitat along the drainage of the Jordan River that runs through its corporate limits,
just south of the property. The master plan of Salt Lake County calls for development of the
Jordan Rive drainage with parks, wildlife habitat and open space.
The appraiser is not aware of any soil or sub-soil conditions in the area which would
prohibit further development or endanger the present improvements. According to the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the property is partially located within the
identifiable boundaries of a flood hazard area. It is located on panel 490103-0002C. The flood
map was adopted September 30, 1994.
The following page contains a copy of the flood map, with subject property noted.
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Flood Map

:ATION

hwest corner or the Murray City
section of Riverside and Halcion
Monument #10)

section of Fair Haven Circle and
'an River Monument #11)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 16

( 6200 South 1200 West)
Access to the site is limited. Currently the only points of ingress and egress to the site is
from El Cimarron Drive, located north of the property. El Cimarron Drive is a residential
collector road the connects to 1300 West. The residential street known as Crystal River Drive,
terminates at the northeast corner of the property. Crystal River Drive is used by Murray city to
access public utilities, water and sewer lines that are located within the Murray portion of the
Jordan River Parkway. Crystal River Drive does not provide public access to the Jordan River
Park or to subject property.
The size of the property presents some development problems in that the site has only one
access point. There is no access to the site from the south, east or west. With 10,000 square foot
lots, a normal residential development of the site would yield about 100 to 115 lots. With only
one access point, approval of the project in its entirety is remote. There is a possibility that this
property can be developed with property to the east or south and overcome the objections of the
one access point.
The land to the east of the site is owned and controlled by Murray City. This land lies
between the property and the Jordan River channel. According to Salt Lake County records, the
areas east of the site have been owned by Murray City for more than 5 years.
The site has been optioned to Murray Parkway, LLC for about 10 months. Carla Parker
is a partner in this development. She reports the development company is in the process of
obtaining approval for development of the entire property.
The property is impacted by the Jordan River meander corridor. This meander corridor
is defined by the historic channel of the Jordan River. Over the years, the Jordan River has
changed courses due to flooding, sedimentation in the river bottom and erosion. This meander
zone includes many oxbow lakes, ponds and in some cases has left some land areas separated from
access to roadways. The appraiser is aware of some areas north of subject in which the changing
river course has resulted in land locked parcels of land.
Salt Lake County Flood Control regulates the areas located withing the Jordan River
Meander Area. With the Jordan River levels and potential flooding impacting more than one
municipality, they have been assigned responsibility for the areas of the river bottoms. Any
development located within the area identified as the meander zone is subjected to approval by Salt
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Lake County Flood Control. In the past they have required various levies, rock filled trenches,
river bank improvements and dedication of open areas prone to flooding. Mr. Brent Beadal of Salt
Lake County Flood Control has informed the appraiser that the developer of this property has
proposed the installation of a rock filled trench to control relocation of the channel along this
property. This rock filled trench is to be installed along the entire easterly boundary of the
property. Mr. Tom Sicusky, of Earthfax, reports the estimated cost of this rock filled trench is
from $110,000 to $130,000. Salt Lake County is in favor of this alternative and would approve
the trench. Murray City has taken the position that the rockfilledtrench does not protect sewer,
water and other utility lines located in their portion of the Murray Parkway. Murray City would
prefer reinforcement of the west bank of the Jordan River with rip rap. According to Mr.
Sicusky, the cost of rip rap is about $65,000 to $70,000. Salt Lake County is not in favor of this
rip rap solution in that they are in the process of an experimental vegetation plan for the Jordan
River. The rip rap reinforcement would threaten the integrity of the vegetation experiment.
The appraiser has calculated that the area that is impacted by the Jordan River Meander
Corridor contains about 6.78 acres. With the cost of being recently optioned for $30,000 per acre,
the "lost" value, if the Jordan River Meander Corridor were left in its natural state, is $203,400.
The current owners have not yet reached and acceptable resolution to the problem of the
size of the development (one access point) or the Jordan River Meander area. With the most
expensive of the solutions being $130,000, the cost of the rockfilledtrench could equate to $3,879
per acre for the entire 33.5247 acres of land. Compared to eliminating the 6.78 acres from
development, the cost of the rock filled trench is a reasonable and economically supported
solution.
The site has visual exposure from 6400 South and also the 1-215 freeway. Access to the
site is provided by El Cimarron Drive, located immediately north of the site. There is no access
from either 6400 South, 1300 West or 1-215. Traffic along El Cimarron Drive is light and
comprised of residential commuters to homes north of subject. There are currently no dividing
islands separating opposing lanes of traffic in El Cimarron Drive. The major north to south
roadway in the area is 1700 West, about 5 blocks to the west of subject. The major east to west
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artery is 6400 South, located south of the site. Development on 6400 South and Redwood Road
includes fast food restaurants, retail sales and local shopping.
Access to 1-15 is provided about 2 miles northeast of the site at 400 West and 5300 South,
with a 4 way on/off ramp. Access to 1-215 is about 1 miles northwest of the site at Redwood Road
and 5600 South. Visual exposure is good from all directions.
The property is located within the incorporated limits of Murray City and falls under
various authorities. Police and fire protection are provided by Murray City, and are considered
good. Taxes are collected annually by Salt Lake County and are on an ad-valorem basis. Taxes
in Salt Lake County are typically 1-1/2% of market value. Business and use regulations are
administered and enforced strictly by Murray City.
The primary uses in the area are associated with single family dwellings and limited
neighborhood type commercial uses. There are some retail stores, restaurants and variety stores
in the area. The secondary streets are primarily developed with single and two family residential
uses on lots of 6,000 to 8,000 square feet. The area is nearly 60% developed, with some large
parcels of vacant land awaiting development or used for agriculture. There has been some new
development in the immediate area. Overall this area has had good and stable growth in the past
5 years. This is similar to the majority of Salt Lake County.
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Lot Size
The property is irregular in shape. It has frontage of about 1,000 feet on El Cimarron
Drive. The property is bounded on the east by the drainage of the Jordan River drainage. It is
bordered on the east by the drainage of the North Jordan Canal.
The appraiser has not been provided a copy of a survey of the site. From the purchase
agreements, the total land area is 0.44 acres from James R. Parker, 19.938 acres from Douglas
A. and Leone S. Parker and 13.1467 acres from Udell G. And Elizabeth M. Parker.
The following page contains a plat map of the area with the property noted.
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Plat Map
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Street Improvements
The following street improvements presently serve subject property along its north
boundary: hard surfaced street, sewer, water, gas electricity and telephone.
There is currently a sanitary sewer main line located east of the sit, located within the
Murray Parkway land.
The property is bordered on the east by the Jordan River drainage, that flows in a
northwesterly direction.

Zoning
According to the "Use" District map before me, subject property is located within the
jurisdiction of Murray City. The property is presently zoned R-1-10. Provisions of the ordinance
for R-1-10 permit medium density residential uses. Minimum lot size is 10,000 square feet per
lot.
The following page contains a copy of the zoning map, with subject property outlined in
red.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 22

( 6200 South 1200 West)
Zoning Map
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Description of Improvements
The property currently has no improvements of contributory value.

Highest and Best Use Defined
That reasonable and probable use that supports the highest present value, as defined, as of
the effective date of the appraisal.
Alternatively, that use, from among reasonably probable and legal alternative uses, found
to be physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and which results in
highest land value.
The definition immediately above applies specifically to the highest and best use of the
land. It is to be recognized that in cases where a site has existing improvements on it, the highest
and best use may very well be determined to be different from the existing use. The existing use
will continue, however, unless and until land value in its highest and best use exceeds the total
value of the property in its existing use.2
Implied in this definition is the recognition of contribution of each specific use to the
overall community development as well as achieving maximum profit for each individual property
owner. The highest and best use is determined by the appraiser, and as such is only an opinion
based upon analysis of facts. In actual appraisal practice, the concept of highest and best use
represents the premise upon which all value conclusions or estimations are based. A property
fully utilizing its highest and best use would be the most profitable, probable and legally permitted
use. This use may be influenced by the improvements which are on the property at the time of
appraisal. Or the existing improvements may be detrimental to the highest and best use of the
property and would represent minimal or negative value.
In estimating highest and best use, there are essentially four stages of analysis:
1. Possible Use - What uses of the site in question are physically possible?
2. Permissible Use - What uses are permitted by zoning and deed restrictions on the site
in question?
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3. Feasible use - Which possible and permissible uses will produce a net return to the
owner of the site?
4. Highest and best use - Among the feasible uses, which use will produce the highest net
return or highest present worth?
The highest and best use of the land (or site) if vacant and available for use may be
different from the highest and best use of the improved property.

This is true when the

improvement is not an appropriate use, but it makes a contribution to the total property value in
excess of the value of the site.
The previously discussed tests must be applied to the property as improved and as vacant.
In arriving at the highest and best use of the property, it was analyzed: 1) as if vacant and
available for development, and 2) as presently improved.
Highest and Best Use as a Vacant Site
In considering the highest and best use of the site as though vacant, the appraiser must
consider the size of the lot to be a benefit upon the possible uses that are physically possible. The
lot size of 33.5247 acres is of sufficient size to permit a developer the ability to install necessary
infrastructure and roads to support most types of residential-developments. A site of say 20 acres
could be of sufficient size to allocate the large sewer, water and engineering costs of any
development. This site has other obstacles to its development, in that access two points of access
must be provided. With the land located just south of the property being planned for residential
development, some cooperative form of access can be obtained over this contiguous property.
Under the provisions of the zoning ordinance, the property must be used for residential
uses. The R-l-10 zoning permits single family dwellings on lots of 10,000 square feet or larger.
The ultimate highest and most profitable use for the site is to be used in conjunction with
other land in the area. Property owners west or south of the site could utilize this site in
conjunction with other land owned and with frontage to either 6400 South or 1300 West. The cost
of bridging the North Jordan Canal could easily be allocated over the site area of 33.5247 acres
or more.
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The zoning ordinance does not limit the use of the site to a great extent. It should also be
noted, Murray City and Salt Lake County have not been receptive to "spot" zoning of specific site
within their jurisdiction. They have historically utilized master plans and zoning guidelines that
allow for an orderly transition from less intensive uses to more intensive uses. Under their
historic plan, they would not spot zone a parcel of land to permit the construction of a shopping
center adjoining land zoned for limited residential development. They would historically buffer
the more intensive uses from the least intensive uses by allowing moderate intensity uses between
the two. For example, Murray City Zoning Department may buffer commercial and single family
uses with high density residential uses.
As to permissible uses, the site is zoned for single family uses. The potential uses available
for the highest and best use of the site are quite limited. The feasibility of the use must be
influenced by recent development in the area. Most of the newer development in the area of the
property is in single family residential subdivisions on lots of 10,000 square feet or larger. With
the recent decline in interest rates, there has been a resurgence of single family dwelling
construction. There are many single family homes in the $100,000 range being speculatively built
by developers. Many builders report brisk sales, with many homes sold prior to completion.
The appraiser is of the opinion that the highest and best use of this site is for single family
dwelling uses.

Estimation of Land Value Vacant
The appraiser will utilize the direct sales comparison approach to estimate the value of the
land as though vacant. The approach involves direct comparisons of the property under appraisal
to similar properties that have recently sold in the market place.
Carefully verified and analyzed market data are good indications of value, especially if they
represent actions of typical buyers, sellers, users and investors in the market place. This approach
is based upon the principle of substitution, in that a prudent buyer should not pay more for a
property than it will cost to buy a comparable substitute property. The price paid by buyers is
usually the result of an extensive search in which alternatives are compared. The property
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purchased usually represents the best available balance between the needs of the buyer and
purchase price.
Individual sales may deviate from a market norm. A sufficient number of sales tends to
produce a pattern indicating the action of buyers and sellers in the open market. If sufficient
numbers of market derived sales are available, the resulting pattern provides a good indication of
market value.
The appraiser has analyzed sales of vacant land in the area, and discovered reliable
information on each. The sales that are included in this report are the most recent and similar
available.
Each sale differs from the subject property, in that none have an identical location.
Adjustments will be made between the known sales and the unknown value estimate of subject.
The unit of comparison considered is the sales price per acre. This unit of comparison is
commonly found in the Salt Lake Market. The important consideration is sufficient size to allow
the highest and best use of the site to be obtained. Each sale has a similar highest and best use as
subject. Properties are bought, sold and compared on the basis of sales price per acre. This unit
of comparison is the quantification of purchase price and size. The following sales are noted,
which have recently taken place and are discussed and analyzed on the pages that follow.
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Land Sale Comparable # 1
Location:

1245 Bullion Street
Murray City, Utah

Size:

10.00 acres

Zoning:

Agricultural

Utilities:

all in street

Sale Date:

April, 1994

Seller:

Alan Tratos

Buyer:

Treasure Valley Real Estate

Sales Price:

$ 400,000

Terms of Sale:

cash to seller

Sales Price per Acre:

$ 40,000

Confirmed by:

agent

Comments: Subdivided into single family lots with adjoining property.
Land Sale Comparable # 5
Location:

3101 South 3690 West
Salt Lake County, Utah

Size:

2.00 acres

Zoning:

Residential

Utilities:

all in street

Sale Date:

August, 1994

Seller:

Ricky Lee Warr

Buyer:

Sudweeks Consulting Incorporated

Sales Price:

$ 60,000

Terms of Sale:

cash

Sales Price per Acre:

$30,500

Confirmed by:

agent

Comments:
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Land Sale Comparable ft 3
1225 West Bullion Street

Location:

Murray City, Utah
Size:

1.03 acres

Zoning:

A-l

Utilities:

all in street

Sale Date:

May, 1995

Seller:

Brent Romney

Buyer:

Marvin L. Hendrickson

Sales Price:

$ 57,000

Terms of Sale:

cash

Sales Price per Acre:

$55,339

Confirmed by:

agent

Comments: Developed with adjoining property into single family lots.
Land Sale Comparable # 4
3300 South 4800 West

Location:

West Valley City, Utah
Size:

15.93 acres

Zoning:

R-l-8

Utilities:

all in street

Sale Date:

August, 1995

Seller:

Jean Paras

Buyer:

Eastland Development Group

Sales Price:

$ 597,950

Terms of Sale:

cash to seller

Sales Price per Acre:

$37,536

Confirmed by:

agent

Comments: Subdivided into single family lots with adjoining property.
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Land Sale Comparable # 5
1750 West 6020 South

Location:

Salt Lake County, Utah
Size:

26.00 acres

Zoning:

Agricultural

Utilities:

all in street, limited access

Sale Date:

November, 1995

Seller:

Bollinger

Buyer:

Eastland Development Group

Sales Price:

$781,200

Terms of Sale:

cash to seller

Sales Price per Acre:

$ 30,046

Confirmed by:

agent

Comments: Subdivided into single family lots with adjoining property.
Land Sale Comparable # 6
6001 South Jordan Canal Road

Location:

Salt Lake County, Utah
Size:

18.66 acres

Zoning:

agricultural

Utilities:

all in street

Sale Date:

November, 1995

Seller:

Betty B. Bollinger

Buyer:

Eastland Development Group

Sales Price:

$ 700,000

Terms of Sale:

cash

Sales Price per Acre:

$ 37,513

Confirmed by:

agent

Comments:
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Summary of Land Sales
The following is a summary of the sales. They are listed in order from the most dated to
the most recent, in terms of sale date.
Sale

Sale

No.

Date

Size

Zone

1.

4-94

10.00 Ac.

2.

8-94

3.

Sale

Sales Price

Access

Price

per Acre

A-1

good

$ 400,000

$ 40,000

2.00 Ac.

Residential

good

61,000

30,500

5-95

1.03 Ac.

A-1

good

57,000

55,339

4.

8-95

15.93 Ac.

R-l-8

good

587,950

37,536

5.

11-95

26.00 Ac.

A-1

fair

781,200

30,046

6.

11-95

18.66 Ac.

A-1

good

700,000

37,513

Adjustments to Sales
Each of the comparable sales differed from subject property in physical and other
characteristics. The most notable being date of sale, location, utility and size. All have similar
zoning, and highest and best use as does subject. An analysis of each of the sales in these
characteristics is as follows:
Date of sale
Generally, during the past 2 years, real estate values in Salt Lake City have increased. The
sales utilized would support this conclusion. Comparing Sale #2 to Sale #6, the data would
suggest that land values have increased 22.99% over the 1.25 years between the sales. If sales
#1 and #6 are compared the data suggest that land values declined 6.21 % over the same period.
The sample considered is not of sufficient size for any in depth statistical analysis. With
the definite trend noted, any adjustment to the sales for date of sale is supported. The appraiser
will adjust the sales based on an increase in value of 6% per year.
It should be noted that a change in value over time is not the result of the passage of time,
but rather a change in market conditions over time. With a definite trend noted in the sales
considered, any adjustment is subjective. As a result, the adjustment reflects the change in market
conditions over the time period of the sales.
Each of the sales will be adjusted +10% per year for the passage of time.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Location
Sale #5 is located in a similar area, compared to subject. This property has limited access
to public roads and was developed in conjunction with the adjoining property. Comparing this
sale to sale #6, the sale with good access require a - 19.90% adjustment for location. Sales #1,
#2, #3, #4 and #6 will be adjusted -20% for location.
Size
Generally smaller more utile parcels of property sell for more per acre than larger parcels.
This is the result of a quantity discount and the fact larger parcels have a limited market in terms
of potential buyers. The following is a summary of the sales, listed in order from the smallest to
largest in terms of size:
Sale

Sales Price

Access

Price

per Acre

A-1

good

$ 57,000

$ 55,339

2.00 Ac.

Residential

good

61,000

30,500

4-94

10.00 Ac.

A-1

good

400,000

40,000

4.

8-95

15.93 Ac.

R-1-8

good

587,950

37,536

6.

11-95

18.66 Ac.

A-1

- good

700,000

37,513

5.

11-95

26.00 Ac.

A-1

fair

781,200

30,046

Sale

Sale

NCL

Date

Size

Zone

3.

5-95

1.03 Ac.

2.

8-94

1.

The data demonstrates not definite trend as it relates to land size. The smallest sale sold
for the higher end of the range and the smallest the lower limit of the range. The sales of from
2.00 acres or larger do not demonstrate any trend.
Each of the sales of less than 11 acres will be adjusted -20% for size.
Shape
Each of the comparable sales were rectangular in shape, similar to subject in utility. No
adjustment is indicated for shape.
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Comparable Land Sale Adjustments
A summary of the previously discussed adjustments is as follows:
Sale
Number Location

Time

Size

Shape

Other

Net

Sales

Adj.

Adj.

Price

Price
$ 32,000

1.

-20 %

+ 20%

20 %

0

0

- 2 0 % $ 40,000

2.

-20 %

+ 18 %

20 %

0

0

-22 %

30,500

23,790

3.

-20%

+ 10%

20 %

0

0

-30%

55,339

38,877

4.

-20%

+ 8 %

0

0

0

-12 %

37,536

33,032

5.

0

+ 6 %

0

0

0

+ 6 % 30,046

31,849

6.

-20%

+ 6%

0

0

0

-14 %

32,261

37,513

Mean average adjusted price is $31,968 per acre
Most Probable Sales Price is $30,000 to $35,000 per acre
Correlation of Land Value
It should be noted that the mean average sales price of the previously noted sales is $31,968
per acre. The range of adjusted sales prices from the lowest to highest is very narrow. The
adjusted sales prices would represent the value range in which the subject must lie. Sale #5 is the
most like subject in terms of location and is near the lower limit of the range. This sale required
the least number and gross adjustments, and should be given the greatest weight.
Sale #6 is similar to subject in size and sales date. This sale defines the upper imit to value
for land in the area.
Use of the mean average sales price for the purposes of a final value estimate of value for
any property is not considered an appropriate appraisal tool. This implies that each of the sales
considered should be given equal weight in the analysis. In as much as each sale is unique in
terms of its size, sale date, physical characteristics and location, the mean average can be a
misleading indicator to value. Some courts have ruled the use of a mean average is not an
acceptable practice by "experts" in real property valuation, the mean average adjusted sales price
is communicated only for illustrative purposes, and is not relied upon by the appraiser.
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A final value conclusion for subject property as vacant of $32,000 per acre is well within
the range of value indicated and is well supported by the sales offered. This conclusion reflects
the reliance place on sales #5 and #6. The calculation of value is as follows:
33,5247 acres @ $32,000 per acre =

$ 1,072,790

Rounded to

$ 1,072,800
Final Value Estimate

Thefinalvalue estimate represents the conclusion of the appraisal process. Therefore, after
carefully considering all of the factors which affect value, including the size, location, age,
condition of improvements, zoning and present market conditions, it is my considered opinion that
the decline in the MARKET VALUE of the previously described land as though vacant is:
ONE MILLION SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NO/100
($1,072,800.00) DOLLARS

Respectfully Submitted,

Jerry iL jVebber, MAI
JRW/sm
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Addenda
Photographs of Subject Property
Certification
Restrictions on Disclosure and Use
Assumptions and Limiting Conditions
Qualifications of the Appraiser
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PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY
about 6200 South 1200 West
Murray City, Utah

fr^iaii^Aati^^JAr.:.»;»,;

Looking South, across property
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T noVina Fast along north Dronertv line

PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY
about 6200 South 1200 West
Murray City, Utah

Looking South, across property
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Looking West, from east Dronertv line

PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY
about 6200 South 1200 West
Murray City, Utah

Looking Southwest, across property
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Looking Southwest, from east property line

PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY
about 6200 South 1200 West
Murray City, Utah
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Looking Northwest, across property
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RESTRICTIONS UPON DISCLOSURE AND USE

1.

Disclosure of the contents of this report is governed by the By-Laws and Regulations of the
Appraisal Institute.

2.

Without prior written consent and approval of the appraiser, the following restrictions and
limitations apply:
a. Neither all nor any part of this report may be reproduced in any form.
b. No dissemination shall be made to the public through advertising media or any other public
means of communication.
c. The conclusions to value, identity of the appraiser, or any reference to the Appraisal Institute
and the MAI Designation.

3.

Acceptance of and/or use of this appraisal report constitutes acceptance of the stated assumptions,
limiting conditions and restrictions.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITING CONDITIONS

1.

The legal description in this appraisal report was received from sources deemed reliable and
is assumed to be correct, but the appraiser takes no responsibility as to its correctness.

2.

No title opinion is rendered herewith, and the property is appraised as though free and clear
of all liens and encumbrances, and on the basis of marketable title, with all rights of
ownership in fee simple.

3.

The improvements are assumed to be within the legally described property and built in
accordance with the requirements of zoning and building ordinances in effect at the time
of construction.

4.

The sketches used in this report are included to assist the reader in visualizing the property,
and the appraiser assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. The appraiser has made no
survey of the property.

5.

The appraiser is not required to give testimony or appear in court, because of having made
this appraisal, with reference to the property in question, unless prior arrangements have
been made.

6.

The distribution of the total valuation in this report between land and improvements applies
under the existing program of utilization. The separate valuations for land and building
must not be used in connection with any other appraisals and are invalid if so used.

7.

The value estimate is based on the market and monetary conditions prevailing as of the date
of value, and cannot be applied to other dates in the past or future.

8.

All market data and other information contained inlhis appraisal report has been gathered
and reasonably investigated by the appraiser to the extent that it is believed to be correct,
but is not guaranteed. No market data or information has been withheld which would tend
to distort the final estimate of value.

9.

The existence of hazardous material, which may or may not be present on the property, was
not observed by the appraiser. The appraiser has no knowledge of the existence of such
materials on or in the property. The appraiser, however, is not qualified to detect such
substances. The presence of substances such as asbestos, urea-formaldehyde foam
insulation, or other potentially hazardous materials may affect the value of the property.
The value estimate is predicated on the assumption that there is no such material in or on
the property that would cause a loss in value. No responsibility is assumed for any
conditions, or for any expertise or engineering knowledge required to discover them. The
client is urged to retain an expert in this field, if desired.
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JERRY R.WEBBER, MAI
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER and CONSULTANT
APPRAISAL QUALIFICATIONS OF JERRY R.WEBBER
LICENSES, DEGREES AND MEMBERSHIPS
Graduated Olympus High School, Salt Lake City, Utah — 1967
Graduated University of Utah — 1971 — B.S. Degree - Management
Received Utah Real Estate Salesman's License in 1970
Received Real Estate Broker's License in 1975
Member of the National Association of Independent Fee Appraisers (N.A.I.F.A.), IFAS Designation 1974-1991
Member Appraisal Institute, MAI Designation
Owner-Broker of Webber Real Estate Company, Salt Lake City, Utah
Member of National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) and Salt Lake Board of Realtors, G.R.I. Designation
Chairman National Education Committee, NAIFA, 1989-1991
President Utah Association of Appraisers, 1991-1992
Certified General Appraiser, Utah License# CG00037024
1995-1998 Member, State of Utah Appraiser Registration Certification Board
APPRAISAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Successfully completed the following courses:
NIREB
12 hours
Real Estate Appraising
NAIFA
24 hours
Residential Appraising
NAIFA
Capitalization Techniques
8 hours
LDS Business College
30 hours
Real Estate Finance
Utah State Bar
24 hours
Uniform Eminent Domain
NAREB
45 hours
Commercial and Investment
Recreation Property Appraising
24 hours
American Society of Appraisers
Income Capitalization
24 hours
AIREA
NAIFA
Mortgage Equity and Today's Financing
14 hours
AIREA
Income Capitalization
80 hours
AIREA
Case Studies
40 hours
20 hours
AIREA/Utah Association of Appraisers
Standards of Professional Practice
Appraising From Blueprints
7 hours
Appraisal Institute
Appraiser as an Expert Witness
7 hours
Appraisal Institute
Understanding Limited Appraisal
7 hours
Appraisal Institute
Appraisal Review
7 hours _
Appraisal Institute
Fair Lending and the Appraiser
6 hours
Utah Association of Appraisers
Developed 8-hour program of Utah Assoc, of Realtors on Appraising
Currently approved by the states of Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska,Missouri, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Indiana,
Oregon, Ohio, Maryland and Washington to teach appraisal courses
Senior Instructor NAIFA 1979-1991
Qualified as an expert witness in District Courts and Federal Courts
Author of text: "Principles of Real Estate Appraisal," NAIFA
Co-author: "Case Studies in Real Estate Appraisal"
Helped develop Condemnation Seminar for NAIFA
Co-author "Capitalization Courses," NAIFA
PARTIAL LIST OF CLIENTELE SERVED
First Security Bank
Key Bank
West One Bank
Zions First National Bank
Jordan School District
Intermountain Association of Credit Men
Small Business Administration
State of Utah - Building Board
Tooele County Commission
Sperry-Univac
Brighton Bank
South Summit School District
Equitable Relocation
Travelers Insurance

First Interstate Bank
Western Management and Maintenance
Capital City Bank
Guardian State Bank
Seven-Eleven Stores
Price Industries
Tooele City
City of South Salt Lake
Alta Industries
Intermountain Pipe and Welding
Westinghouse Electric
Industrial Supply Company
State of Utah, Natural Resources
Numerous attorneys in Salt Lake, Davis and Utah Counties
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PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

W

ALl-STATE LEGAl SUPPLY CO

DEBT OWED ON MURRAY PARKWAY ASSOCIATES 4/96

Doug and Leone Parker
Less 8/25/95

Down payment

$598,140.00
(50.000.001
$548,140.00

Balance due

Parker Family Trust
Less 8/28/95

Down payment

$165,600.00
(25.000.00)
$140,600.00

Balance due

$165,600.00

Hazel Simpson
Less 8/28/95

Down payment

(25.000.00)
$140,600.00

Balance due

James R. Parker
Less 8/25/95

Down payment

$13,200.00
(200.00)

Balance due
TOTAL OWED AS OP 4/96
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$13.000.00
$842,340.00
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
CAUTION: READ BEFORE YOU SIGN
(If
(2)
f3)

This is a legally binding contract; if you do not understand it. seek legal advice before you sign.
This contract is intended to be filled in by lawyers or real estate brokers. All others seek professional advice.
To assure protection of certain priority rights in the Property, recordation of this contract and any assignments, addenda, or
legally sufficient notices of interest is highly recommended.

V M t aTnrLo«r'^m':JKffs'Eiin-g^^yf°e'7')"9USt / 9 — " " " " T "

D0U6LAS A

'

(hereafter collectively called "Buyer"), whose address is

6305 South 1300 West. Murray. UT 84123
.2.

ProRertv.. Seller agr.ees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy the real property (the''Property") located at

. C r y s t a l River Drive

(ctf ,., 8ddresS).

in the city of

Murray

Approximately

0<sbU

SOUt

m„n, yn( Salt Lake

State of Utah, described as:

See Exhibit "A", attached hereto.

3.

Date of Pot session.

August
4.

Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buver agrees to enter into possession of the Propeay on the <-Q™

IQ 95.

Price and Payment.

Buyer agrees to pay for the Propeny the purchase price-of

Approximately

EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY & 0 0 / 1 0 0 - - - - : J f e { s 598.140.0Q
„r,n

day of

.

c;.||, f -« n M . f nn . h . Inlawing . „ „ , . -

F 1 H Y

IHUUSAND

5U6

00/100

FIVE

HUNDRED

NINc.li-

payable at Seller's address above given.
- -

- - - - _ - - - - - - - - • . • • • .

The amount of $10,541.15 principal, together with accrued interest is due and payable
upon the closing of each of the first 52 lots of the 57 lots developed on the Seller's
property shown on the proposed plat of MURRAY PARKWAY ESTATES SUBDIVISION that fall
within the boundary of the land being purchased hereunder. Interest will accrue at
10% per annum on the unpaid balance commencing on the date that the subdivision plat
is recorded until paid. At the time legal descriptions are finalized, Buyers and
Sellers agree to execute the necessary documents to convert the terms of this Contract
to a Note and First Trust Deed, including a Warranty Deed to convey fee title to the
Buyers. These documents will be hind in Escrow by Merrill Title Company and recorded
simultaneously with the recordation of the subdivision plat to consumate the conversion,
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PROMISSORY NOTE

$..5.48,.1.4CLJQQ

S e p t e m b e r 1,919-35.
CER

and

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promise(s) to pay t o . . P . P ^ M . S A - . - . g ^ g J
._lJgQffg. S * PARKER,
husband and w i f e , a s j o i n t t e n a n t s
or order, . m . E . J I I f f l D R ^ ^
($^*14Q.JIQL_),
together with interest fcKDtxbataat the rate of..-Ten
per cent, (—10-0—%) per annum on the unpaid balance, payable as

follows, viz: xnterest shall begin ta accrue upon the recordation of the Murray Parkway Estate
ets
Subdivision. The principal sum of $10,962.80, together with accrued interest shall be
due and payable upon the closing of the sale of the first fifty (50) lots in the propos<ell
Murray Parkway Estate Subdivision encumbered by the Trust Deed securing this Note.

H *-.
L| CD
L] CX.

-•->

d
tcx>

o
OJ

X

CD

«'
J3

i

in lawful money of the United States of America, negotiable and payable at the office of ....-§s.. .djir e c t e n Jyy h o I d e r

a

without defalcation or discount. All payments hereinabove provided for shall be applied first on accrued interest and balance to
• reduction of principal. Any installments of principal and interest not paid when due shall, at the option of the legal holder
hereof, bear interest thereafter at the rate of —Ten _%
p e r annum until paid.

o

bo

In case of default in the payment of any installment of principal or interest as herein stipulated, then it shall be optional
with the legal holder of this note to declare the entire principal sum hereof due and payable; and proceedings may at once be
instituted for the recovery of the same by law, with accrued interest and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.
The makers and endorsers severally waive presentment, protest and demand; and waive notice of protest, demand and of dishonor and non-payment of this note, and expressly agree that this note, or any payment thereunder, may be extended from time
to time without in any way effecting the liability of the makers and endorsers thereof.
This note and the interest thereon is secured by a first iW#Cg3gfcX3ac T r u s t D e e d o n F i f t y

Five

(55)

Lots

in the proposed Murray Parkway E s t a t e s S u b d i v i s i o n .

.1°
• (D

O
bO
CD
f-i

Murra
Lia

Parkway Associates, a Utah Limited
Comp

t ik^M^Jm^^

~ >"<%*=<r*-
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
CAUTION: R E A D B E F O R E Y O U SIGN
(1J

This is a tegaily binding contract; if you do not understand

(2)

This contract is intended to be filled in by lawyers or real estate brokers. All others seek professional

(3)

To assure protection
legally sufficient

Parties.

it. seek iegal advice before you sign.

of certain priority rights in the Property, recordation

notices of interest is highly

recommended.

rflvaV °*

This contract, made end entered into this

(hereafter collectively celled "Seller"), whose address is

advice.

of this contract and any assignments, addenda, or

6349

South

August

1300

19 J z J L _ is by and between

West,

Murray,

UT

84123

MURRAY PARKWAY ASSOCIATES. L . L . C . , a Utah L i m i t e d L i a b i l i t y Company

ttnd

(hAr r t W ftftrrnllBrfii/nlYr«llnH"R..yAr") - W hnci>iiriHr^^k
2.

Property.

6305

SOUth

1300

WeSt,

Murray,

UT

Seller agrees to sell and Euyer agrees to buy the real property (the "Property") located at

vacant ground

( slr ei!l addreS s).

in the city of

Murray

&4123
Approximate I V

County of

U. 4H

aCrG

S a l t Lake

State of Utah, described as:

See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

3.

D a t e of P o s s e s s i o n .

August
4.
TWO

Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buyer agrees to enter into possession of the Property on the

day of

iq 95.

Price and P a y m e n t .
HIINORFD

and

Buyer agrees to pay for the Property the purchase price of

or to Seller's order, on the following terms:

Dollars (5 <iuU . UU

Q p P r Q X " ! ^t e l y

THIRTEEN

THOUSAiNu-—

00/100
Tv/0

Hundred

and

Dollars ($
00/100

1 J * C \ J \ J * LIU ) payable at Seller's address above given.

) down payment, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of fl P P r Q X Ifllrj t f i 1v TH1RTFFN
J"JLTDollars ($ 1<J ^ UUU . UU
) being paid as follows:

THOUSAND a n c i O O / 1 0 0 —

The total purchase price will be the exact final acreage calculation multiplied by $30,000,
per acre. The total balance due shall be paid in full upon the recordation of the subdivi<
plat for MURRAY PARKWAY ESTATES SUBDIVISION.
Seller agrees to execute a Warranty Deed in favor of Buyer to be held in Escrow at Merrill
Title Company until such time as the entire cash balance has been paid in full to Seller.
Buyer and Seller agree to exchange an equal amount of acreage (approximately 1.08 acres)
to accomodate the Buyer's development of MURRAY PARKWAY ESTATES SUBDIVISION, said exchange
will be for an equal amount of land presently being purchased by the Buyer from Douglas A.
and Leone S. Parker, which exchange parcel will join the property being retained by Seller
on the North. Seller and Buyer will execute the necessary Warranty Deeds for the exchange
as soon as the final legal descriptions have been determined by an accurate survey.
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
CAUTION: READ BEFORE Y O U SIGN
ft)

This is a legally binding contract: if you do not understand it. seek legal advice before you sign.

(2)

This contract is intended to be filled in by lawyers or real estate brokers. All others seek professional

(3)

To assure protection
legol/y sufficient

1.

Partiof,

of certain priority rights in the Property, recordation

notices of interest is highly

(hefeaf^r^cglleqiive^callo^-S,

MAv'yMw^^fettTerffi'. c°: a m^L ted

(hfffffafiarcnllfieiivfl-lyenllQd-Riiyflr") whncn utirir^<i\<
2.

Property.

addenda, or

recommended.

ndenteredimo.his 28th d 8 y o f August
, 9 _ii is by e n d b e t w 6 e n UDELL G . PARKER
' T m s t p p s o f THF PARKFR FAMII Y TRUST: and HAZEL PARKER SIMPSON
6421 and 6441 Sout 13UU West, Murray, Ul b 4 i Z i
L i a b i I i t y Comgan

Th[s contrac

and ELIZABETH M.
ond

advice.

of this contract and any assignments,

6305

SOUth

1300 WeSt,

Murray,

UT

B4123

Seller agrees to sell and Buyor agrees to buy the real property (the "Property") located at A p p r o x i m a t e l y

Crvstal River Drive

(street address), in the City of

Murray

#

County of

S d 11

DobU

POUCH

Lake

State of Utah, described os:

See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

.3.

Date o f Pot*a$s\on.

August
4.

n

19.

Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buyer agrees to enter into possession of the Property on the

23th

.dayof

^

Price a n d P a y m e n t .

.Buyer career to pay/or the Property the purchase price of T h r e e

Two Hundred & 00/100 D o l l a r s

(approximately)

Do! , ars {$

Hundred

EiahtV

One T h o u s a n d

381, ^UO. UU payflh|ft at ^^^ a H ^ , ***** given.

Or to Siller's nrripr• nn thw fnllnwinn turmsFJftV
ThpUSand and 0 0 / 1 0 0
Dollars ( $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) down payrnent. receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and th

Thousand iwo Hundred & 00/100 Dollars (approximately)

ghaunrpnf Three Hundred inirtv Une
Dollars (5

3 o l , Z 0 0 . 0 Q being paid as follows:

Fifty Thousand and 00/100 dollars due and payable upon the recordation of the Subdivision
Plat. The remaining 5281,200.00 (approximately) will be paid in the amount of S6,248.89
principal, together with any accrued interest due and payable upon the closing of each of
the first 45 lots of the 50 lots developed on the Seller's property shown on the proposed
plat of MURRAY PARKWAY ESTATES SUBDIVISION that fall within the boundary of the land being
purchased hereunder. Interest will accrue at 10% per annum on the unpaid balance commenci
2 years from the recording of the subdivision plat. At the time the legal .descriptions ar
finalized, Buyers and Sellers agree to execute the Necessary documents to convert the term
of this Contract to a Note and First Trust Deed, including a Warranty Deed to convey fee
title to the Buyers. These documents will be held in Escrow by Merrill Title Company and
recorded simultaneously with the first phase of the subdivision to consumate the conversio

/v\M

cy^j^o
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B Cyprus Credit Union
Magna Branch
:J50r> So. 8400 UVsc
(801)250-7201

Midvalley Branch
575u So. Redwood Road
(S01) 968-0286

Mp.mhp.r Statp.mp.nt
West Jordan Branch
1381 W. 90th South
(801) 250-9021

Operations Center
3505 So. 8400 West
Magna. LT 84044
(SOU 250-5S58

?

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHI!

L

ALLSTATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO

PARKER
DALE S
1772 W
SLC UT

ENT LTD PARTNERSHIP
PARKER
DOVE HOLLOW CIR
84118

74823
STATEMENT DATE: FROM

01FEB96

TO

PAGE 1
31MAR96

HOME LOANS. INCLUDING 1ST MORTGAGE AND HOME EQUITY. NEW AND USED AUTOS AND VISA—OUR RATES ARE LOW ON
lYTHING WHICH MEANS YOU'LL SAVE MONEY ON YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENTS BY 'FINANCING AT CYPRUS. LEAVE A MESSAGE WITH
X (PAN INFORMATION DIM OUR MPW I QAN-RY-PHONF SVSTPM AIMn WPI 1 ftPT R A ^ WITM vnn PlftMT AWAV PAH ^ V Q O O n
S1 SHARE A/C - REGULAR SHARES
E

DESCRIPTION

(Joint with CARLA K PARKER)
Previous Balance
331* DIVIDEND CREDIT

AMOUNT

BALANCE

0.25

30.06
30.31

DATE

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

Annual Percentage Yield Earned: 3.38%
For the Period from 01/01 through 03/31.
MAR31 Closing Date...New Balance

BALANCE

30.31

S5 SHARE A/C - SHAREDRAFT CHECKING
E

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

(Joint with CARLA K PARKER)
Previous Balance „
„
7 T'FER TO 50830L20 &u.r« £o
331# DIVIDEND CREDIT

900.004.59

BALANCE
954.83
54.83
59.42

DATE

DESCRIPTION

YTD TAX INFORMATION
YEAR TO DATE DIV/INT
S1
S5
Total

AMOUNT

Annual Percentage Yield Earned: 2.01%
For the Period from 01/01 through 03/31,
MAR31 Closing Date...New Balance

0.25
4.59
4.84

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BALANCE

59.42

Member Statement

m Cyprus Credit Union
Midvalley Branch
5750 So. Rodvvood Road
(801)968-9286

Magna Branch
.T)05 So. 8400 West
(801) 250-7201

West Jordan Branch
13S1 \V. 90th South
(801)255-9621

CARLA K PARKER
1772 W DOVE HOLLOW CIR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84118

Operations Center
3505 So. 8400 West
Magna, UT 84044
(801) 250-5858

NCUA

50830
STATEMENT DATE: FROM

01FEB96

TO

PAGE 1
31MAR96

HOME LOANS, INCLUDING 1ST MORTGAGE AND HOME EQUITY, NEW AND USED AUTOS AND VISA--OUR RATES ARE LOW ON
RYTHING WHICH MEANS YOU'LL SAVE MONEY ON YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENTS BY FINANCING AT CYPRUS. LEAVE A MESSAGE WITH
R LOAN INFORMATION ON OUR NEW LOAN-BY-PHONE SYSTEM AND WEIL GET BACK WITH YOU RIGHT AWAY. CALL 252-9000.

-BEE22S
AMOUNT

E

DESCRIPTION
Previous Balance
T'FER TO 74021S5
B7
CHECK DEPOSIT
B28 CHECK DEPOSIT
1 CASH WITHDRAWAL

200.00575.00
1387.11
500.00-

REGULAR SHARES
BALANCE
3321.55
3121 .55
,
3696..55
5083..66
4583.66

DATE DESCRIPTION
AMOUNT
MAR31# DIVIDEND CREDIT
50.07
Annual Percentage Yield Earned: 3.52%
For the Period from 01/01 through 03/31.
MAR31 Closing Date...New Balance

L20 LOAN A/C - NEW AUTO
DATE
FEB1
FEB1
FEB1
FEB12
MAR6
MAR7
MAR27
MAR31
YEAR TO

FINANCE CHARGE
DESCRIPTION
Previous Balance
* ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE
7.900
149.58
DAILY PERIODIC RATE 0.00021644
240.50
PAYMENT TR/M016 1201.00
10.25
PAYMENT TR#644 1201.00
199.82
CHECK PAYMENT 1201. 0J>-—>*x
T'FER FROM 74823S5<§00.007
YTO TAX INFORMATION
Closing Date. .;New BaTaTfce
DATE DIV/INT
and
S1
Total

50.07
50.07

NEW LOAN PRINCIPLE

BALANCE
49363.88

1051.42 48312.46
960.50 47351.96
1190.75,. 46161 .21
461.03
700.18 45^

cz

FINANCE CHARGES
L20
Total

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
t*\ imay contain errors.

1098.62
1098.62

BALANCE
4633.73
4633.73

Cyprus Credit Union
P.O. Box 326
Magna, UT 84044

14 MAY 1997

Cyprus Credit Union
(801; 250-5858 P 0 Box 326 Magna, Utah

lUb/c

02:18PM

PAGE: 1

CLIENT NO.
- 50830
SOCIAL SEC. NO. - 529648182

177c w Duv'E HOLLOW CIR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 6 4 U 5

DEPT - 99 NON-PAYROLL

BRANCH - £ MIDVflLLEY

LISTING OF TRANSACTIONS FROM 81 JAN 1996 THROUGH 14 MAY 1997

SI - REGULAR SHARES

Op
96
98
48

Eff.
Date

Posted
i'aM%
19JAN96

.4
54
63
63

19JAN96
29JAN96
29JAN96
02FEB96
07FEB96
21FE596

90

23FEB96

46
21MAR96
31 31MAR96 30MAR96
31
30MAR96
31
30rtAR96
6
01APR96
+3
waAPRvo
10
16APR96
38
26MAY96
29
6
53

10JUN96
13JUN96
20JUN96

M
26JUN96
ii 30JUN96 29JUN96
ii
29JUN96
ii
29JUN98
38SEP56
30SEP96
7
30SEP96
:0
03OCT96

Transaction

Debits

Credits

151.33
TO 659155
83.00
TO 6591S5
13,800.00
TO 6591S5
4,149.63
DEPOSIT
1,201.00
TO 50630120
£00.00
TO 74021S5
575.80
DEPOSIT
L^EIA CASHED
Check 50.60 Casn Back 50.00
1,387.11
dm DEPOSIT
Check 1,787.11 Cash Back 400.00
50^.yw
tiit v7
CASH WITHDRAWAL
DIVIDEND CREDIT
Annual Percentage Yieid Earnea: 3.52*
1,196.25
For tne Period fros 01/01 through 03/31.
C, t>t'0. H
u£Di DEPOSIT
3,500.00
T:FER TO 659133
£5,291.20
7:FER TO 6551S5
DEPOSIT TRs897
.8,000.30
Off-Us £5291.20
150.00
T'FES T0 5M38S5
1,494.60
CASH WITHDRAWAL
o, Hi* ii
DEPOSIT TF;;591
Casn Back 200.03 Off-Us 169^.60
JJ.OO
T:FER 7u 5083055
DIVIDEND CREDIT
18.13
Annual Percentage Yield Earned; 3.70*
For tne Period froa 04/01 through 06/30.
DIVIDEND CREDIT
Digitized by the
Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Annual Percentage
Yield
Earned:
3.36%
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fcr ;ne Period froi 07/01 through 09/33.
CnEC.-, CASHED
Check 438.33 Cash Back *M.M
T'FER
T'FER
T'FER
CHECK
T'FER
T'FER
CHECK

Not
H/'Q Balance Chk No St a
10| *tJJ. 7J

13,372.95
372.95
4,522.55
U, UU4. J J

ii, 111 1. J J

3,696.55

5,063.66
^, 3tiu.bb

4,633.73

j , dCjt

jd

3,329-. 96
329.96
25,621.18
7,621.18
7

c

:-i

«o

9,015.73
i, t'lj. tO
i,«<i.-tn

1,281.5/

i,061.57

Member Statement

Cyprus Credit Union
West Jordan Branch
1381 W. 90th South
(S01) 255-9621

Mid valley Branch
5750 So. Redwood Road
(801)968-9286

Magna Branch
:j:i()5 So. 8400 West
(801)250-7201

CARLA K PARKER
1772 W DOVE HOLLOW CIR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84118

Operations Center
3505 So. 8400 West
Magna, UT 840*44
(801)250-5858

NCUA

50830
STATEMENT DATE: FROM

01FEB96

TO

1
„. P A G E
? 31MAR96

HOME LOANS, INCLUDING 1ST MORTGAGE AND HOME EQUITY, NEW AND USED AUTOS AND VISA—OUR RATES ARE LOW ON
RYTHING WHICH MEANS YOU'LL SAVE MONEY ON YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENTS BY FINANCING AT CYPRUS. LEAVE A MESSAGE WITH
IR LOAN INFORMATION ON OUR NEW LOAN-BY-PHONE SYSTEM AND W E I L GET BACK WITH YOU RIGHT AWAY. CALL 2 5 2 - 9 0 0 0 .
S1 SHARE A/C -REGULAR SHARES
"E DESCRIPTION
I
Previous Balance
!
T'FER TO 74021S5
:B7
CHECK DEPOSIT
:B28 CHECK DEPOSIT
!1 CASH WITHDRAWAL

AMOUNT
200.00575.00
1387.11
500.00-

BALANCE
3321.55
3121.55
3696.55
5083.66
4583.66

DATE DESCRIPTION
AMOUNT
MAR31* DIVIDEND CREDIT
50.07
Annual Percentage Yield Earned: 3.52%
For the Period from 01/01 through 03/31.
MAR31 Closing Date...New Balance

L20 LOAN A / C - NEW AUTO
DATE
FEB1
FEB1
FEB1
FEB12
MAR6
MAR7
MAR27
MAR31
YEAR TO

FINANCE CHARGE
DESCRIPTION
Previous Balance
* ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE
7.900
149.58
DAILY PERIODIC RATE 0.00021644
240.50
PAYMENT TR/M016 1201.00
10.25
PAYMENT TR#644 1201.00
199.82
CHECK PAYMENT 1201.00- >v.
T'FER FROM 74823S5 <300.00j
YTO TAX INFORMATION
Closing Date...New Balance
DATE DIV/INT
and
S1
Total

50.07
50.07

INCIF>LE

1051
960
1190
700

48312.46
47351.96
46161.21
454£JU03- .
-25461.03

FINANCE CHARGES
L20
Total

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r\^

42
50
75r
18

BALANCE
49363.88

1098.62
1098.62

BALANCE
4633.73
4633.73

B Cyprus Credit Union
Midvalley Branch
5750 So. Redwood Road
(801) 968-9286

Magna Branch
3505 So. 8400 West
(801) 250-7201

Member Statement
Operations Center
3505 So. 8400 West
Magna, UT 84044
(801) 250-5858

West Jordan Branch
1381 W. 90th South
(801) 255-9621

DALE S PARKER
6305 S 1300 W
MURRAY UT 84123 6733

96770
STATEMENT DATE: FROM

PAGE 1
30APR96

01APR96

R AUTO LOAN RATES JUST WENT DOWN TO 6.90%,SO IF YOU HAVE A VEHICLE FINANCED SOMEWHERE ELSE, BRING IT TO
S FOR REFINANCING AND TO SAVE MONEY: USE OUR LOAN-BY-PHONE AT 252-9000 TO SIGN UP FOR A FAST LOAN OVER THE
'£. SEE US FOR YOUR FIRST MORTGAGE LOAN. WE CAN HELP FROM START TO FINISH WITH ALL YOUR BORROWING NEEDS.

St SHARE A/C - R E G U L A R SHARES
DESCR][PTION
PrevicDUS Ba lance

BALANCE , DATE
50.27 | APR30

AMOUNT

DESCRIPTION
Closiiig Date...N ew Balance3

AMOUNT

BALANCE
50.27

S5 SHARE A/C - SHAREDRAFT CHECKING
BALANCE
6984.91 I
58.00- 6926.91
33.96- 6892.95
765.70- 6127.25
33.00- 6094.25
98.20- 5996.05
23.79- 5972.26
971.00- 5001.26
200.00- 4801.26
1000.00- 3801.26
322.00- 3479.26
33.00- 3446.26
140.ll- 3306.15
IS.89- 3290.26
74.00- 3216.26
1000.00- 2216.26
718.89- 1497.37 '
12.64-. 1484.73
37.82- 1446.91
6446.91
5000.00
. 5000.00 11446.91
33.00- 11413.91
20.63- 11393.28

DESCR][PTION
Previous Balance
SHARE DRAFT NO. 210
SHARE DRAFT NO. 209
SHARE DRAFT NO. 211
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5751
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5753
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5752
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5747
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5750
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5754
SHARE DRAFT NO. 212
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5755
SHARE DRAFT NO. 213
SHARE DRAFT NO. 214
SHARE DRAFT NO. 217
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5756
SHARE DRAFT NO. 215
SHARE DRAFT NO. 216
SHARE DRAFT NO. 218
15 CASH DEPOSIT
15 CASH DEPOSIT
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5757
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5759

AMOUNT

DATE
APR17
APR17
APR17
APR17
APR18
APR18
APR18
APR19
APR19
APR19
APR19
APR22
APR22
APR23
APR23
APR23
APR24
APR24
APR26
APR29
APR30
APR30
APR30-

DESCRIPTION
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5762
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5764
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5767
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5770
SHARE DRAFT NO. 219
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5758
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5766
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5760
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5761
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5763
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5769
SHARE DRAFT NO. 221
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5773
SHARE DRAFT NO. 220
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5772
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5775
SHARE DRAFT NO. 222
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5774
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5771
SHARE DRAFT NO.1 5765
SHARE DRAFT NO. 223
SHARE DRAFT NO. 5776
Closing Date...New Balance

AMOUNT
BALANCE
23 .60- 11369.68
33 .75- 11335.93
75 .62- 11260.31
1463 .00- 9797.31
11 .04- 9786.27
81 .09- 9705.18
180 .00- 9525.18
113 .58- 9411.60
65 .06- 9346.54
150 .00- 9196.54
343 00- 8853.54
69 .95- 8783.59
33 00- 8750.59
22 11- 8728.48
1969 20- 6759.28
33 00- 6726.28
32 71- 6693.57
136 38- 6557.19
1574.94
4982 251326.94
248 001302.41
24 531269.41
33 001269.41

. CHECK NUMBER RECAP ^___
E

CHECK

AMOUNT

DATE

CHECK

2
1
2
8
10
10
11
11
10
15
18

209
210
21.1
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

33 .96
58 .00
765 .70
322 .00
14'0 . 11
15 .89
718 .89
12 .64
74 .00
37 .82
11 .04

APR23
APR22
APR24
APR30
APR8
APR8
APR2
APR4
APR2
APR8
APR9

220
221
222
223
5747 *
5750 *
5751
5752
5753
5754
5755

AMOUNT
22.11 I
69.95
32.71
24.53
971.00
200.00
33.00
23.79
98.201000.00
33.00 I

DATE

CHECK

AMOUNT

APR10
APR16
APR18
APR17
APR19
APR19
APR17
APR19
APR17
APR29
APR18

5756
5757
5758
5759
5760
5761
5762
5763
5764
5765
57S6

1000.00
33.00
81.09
20.63
113.58
65.06
23.60
150.00
33.75
248.00
180.00

LUMBERS NOT CONSECUTIVE

___•
•

LLLLI
i'tWflatild'KOT|,11W

YEAR TO DATE DIV/ir4T
S1
S5
Total

0.27
134.67
134 .94

,
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DATE

CHECK

APR17
APR19
APR17
APR26
APR23
APR22
APR24
APR23
APR30

5767
5769 *
5770
5771
5772
5773
5774
5775
5776

AMOUNT
75.62
343.00
1463.00
4982.25
1969.20
33.00
136.38
33.00
33.00

Member Statement

^ Cyprus Credit Union

West Jordan Branch
Midvalley Branch
5760 So. Redwood Road 1381 W. 90th South
(801) 255-9621
(801) 968-9286

Magna Branch
3505 So. 8400 West
(801) 250-7201

DALE S PARKER
6305 SOUTH 1300 WEST
ASPEN VIEW HOMES CONSTRUCT
MURRAY UT 84123

Operations Center
3505 So. 8400 West
Magna, UT 84044
(801) 250-5858

NCUA

57172
STATEMENT DATE: FROM

01APR96

TO

PAGE 1
30APR96

)UR AUTO LOAN RATES JUST WENT DOWN TO 6.90%, SO IF YOU HAVE A VEHICLE FINANCED SOMEWHERE ELSE, BRING IT TO
VS FOR REFINANCING AND TO SAVE MONEY. USE OUR LOAN-BY-PHONE AT 252-9000 TO SIGN UP FOR A FAST LOAN OVER TH
DNE. SEE US FOR YOUR FIRST MORTGAGE LOAN. WE CAN HELP FROM START TO, FINISH WITH ALL YOUR BORROWING NEE
S1 SHARE A/C - REGULAR SHARES
E

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

BALANCE

(Joint with PARKER CARLA K.)
Previous Balance

DATE
APR30

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

Closing Date...New Balance

BALANCE
51 .26

51.26

S5 SHARE A/C - SHAREDRAFT CHECKING
E

DESCRIPTION
Previous Balance
CASH WITHDRAWAL
R8
CHECK CASHED FOR 99.00

AMOUNT
200.000.00

BALANCE
437.20
237.20
237.20

DATE
APR18
APR30

DESCRIPTION
CHECK COPY FEE #5592
Closing Date...New Balance

-j'H'iw«<;id'i;'itiH'i:iYEAR TO DATE DIV/INT
S1
S5
Total

-

0.43
5.45
5.88
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AMOUNT
2.00-

BALANCE
235.20
235.20

STATEMENT DATE
APRIL 18, 1996
PAGE
1

'IONS BANK
For 24-Hour Account Information
call Rtddi-Ruponjt at 97<f-S,W0

ll..l..l..l...llll...l...l.l..ll„l„.ll,.,.ll,l,l,ll,„l.l,.l
CARLA K PARKER
150 E VINE ST
MURRAY UT 84l07~1*831

<orl-S00-789-2265

V

017-37058-6

ARY

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

ACCOUNT NUMBER

EXECUTIVE SUPER GOLD-MMA

017-37058-6

LOANS/CREDIT BALANCE

CHECKING/SAVINGS BALANCE

ILE
17 ,544.07
17 ,544.07

TOTAL

00

TOTAL
8

KING
UNT

017-37058-6
EXECUTIVE SUPER GOLD-MMA
PREVIOUS
DEPOSITS/CREDITS..
...CHECKS
BALANCE
NO
AMOUNT
MO
AMOUNT
719.24
3
17,454.27
INTEREST PAID YEAR TO DATE 1996

SITS
/16
14/16
14/18

16 256.34+
1 196.25+
1.68+

6

619.44

DATE. ..CHECK NO

03/21
03/21

371.44
47.00

03/25
03/25

10.00

10.00

17 ,544.07

DEPOSIT
DEPOSIT
INTEREST

AMOUNT

HER CHARGES
•4/18

1

ENDING
BALANCE

5.98

IECKS PROCESSED
DATE...CHECK NO
134
135

... OTHER CHARGES...
NO
AMOUNT

136
137

AMOUNT
65.00
6.00

DATE
03/29
04/12

CHECK NO. .
138
139

. AMOUNT
65.00
65.00

SERVICE FEE

ILY BALANCE
3/21
300.80
3/25
229.80
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE YIELD EARNED
NUMBER OF DAYS IN PERIOD

03/29
04/12
2.01%
30

164.80
99.80

04/16
04/18
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17. 552.39
17, 544.07

April 30. 1996
First Intarstata Bank of Utah, N.A.
180 South Main
Salt Laka City. UT 81101

Bank

Pag* 1 of 3
46
Account No. 00021042197

REALTY BROKERS PERFORflANCE
GEHERAL ACCOUNT
150 E VINE ST
MURRAY UT 84107-1831

Questions about your
account?
Call our
Day It Night Banking CantaV-*
at 801 864 8020

*841074831509*
Coaaorclal Checking
April 1 - April 30. 1996
Beginning ladgar balanct
Dtposits
Elactronlc dtposits/bank cradits
Total Cradits
Chacks
Elactronic dabits'bank dabits
Total Dabits
Ending ladgar batanca

$ 16,054.58
23, 993.76
.00
23.993.76
30, 860.73
.00
30.860.73
* 9.187.61

Daposits
Nuabtr

Data
Aaount
04/02
5.070.00
04/03
3.600.00
04/05
5,098.00
Total Daposlts ( 6 itaas)
TOTAL DEPOSITS/CREDITS ( 6 itaas)

Nuabar

Data
04/11
04/23
04/30

Avount
3,265.76
60.00
6.900.00
$ 23.993.76
t 23,993.76

Chacks
Nuabar
300
301

Data
04/12
04/15

Aaount
434.14
230.84

Nuabar
302
303

Data
04/15
04/16

Aaount
682.08
463.62

TRACE ID
TRACE ID
00000059580125
00000053206086
00000058846767
00000058686848
00000053841773
00000053184385
Notai An astarisk(a) naxt to any chack listad about aaans thara has bat>| 00000058079790 nua00000059029321
stqutnct of your chacks

Bank
Coaaarclal Checking
April 1 - April 30. 1996
Pagt 2 of 3
Account No. 00021042197

Nuabar
3333*
3339*
3340
3341
3342
3343
3344
3345
3346
3347
3348
3349 '
3350
3351
3352
3353
3354
3355
3356
3357
3358

Data
04/02
04/08
04/02
04/03
' 04/02
04/02
04/05
04/02
04/02
04/03
04/02
04/01
04/03
04/02
04/08"
04/03 •
04/03
04/05
04/03
04/03
04/04

Aaount
1.196.25 .
2.74
. 175.00
267.00
561.50
275.00
61.00
29.72
125.93
368.33
60.00
144.00
2.107.00
278.80
46.97
3,723.58
561.24
235.00
5,009.00
3,600.00
1.819.51

Nuabar'
3359
3360
3361
3363*
3366*
3367
3368
3369
3370
3371
3372
3373
3374
3375
3376
3377
3378
3380«
3381
3382
3386«

Data
04/08
04/12
04/16
04/17
04/16
04/18
04/22
04/17
04/19
04/15
04/16
04/26
04/17
04/19
04/23
04/29
04/25
04/26
04/24
04/30
04/30

Aaount
467.50
36.37
500.00
84.90
382.16
483.40
597.49
1.196.25
1.201.00
500.00
7.07
241.16
1.500.00
110.00
467.49
53.00
68.98
255.64
39.21
195.00
15.86

Nottt An astariskC*) naxt to any chtck listad ebovt aaans thtra has btt
saquanca of your chacks
Total Chacks ( 46 itaas)
$ 30.860.73
TOTAL CHECKS/DEBITS < 46 ITEMS)
$ 30,860.73
Dally ladg tr balanct
Daily I tdg tr balanct
aily t adg •r balanct
5.955.84
04/17
15,910.58
8,707.51
04/01
04/08
11.973.27
5.472.44
18,278.38
04/11
04/18
04/02
04/12
4,161.44
04/19
11.502.76
6,242.23
04/03
10,089.84
04/22
3.563.95
04/04
4,422.72
04/15
8,736.99
04/23
3.156.46
04/16
9,224.72
04/05

TRACE ID
TRACE ID
00000056735166^ 00000058132852
00000059863095 *#* 00000040059850
00000057142503 1 #
00000059857615 ?*"*00000058038280
00000053196218^ 00000056878105
00000059032267 •":> 00000056892270
00000053204333 *??;
00000059808179W 00000040092908
00000257067394 -/> 00000058232387
00000053186574 ^ 000OOCMOOO89O5
00000058677011 •& DC?00C058132754
00000059023129 *'*
00000056810782 : '* 00000040746336
00000058612294 ~ 00000040091479
00000059061718 : :•00000058230283
00000057076426 ' 00000040386383
00000057077671 '
00000057690324
00000059151630
00DO0O4O6536O5
00000059514439
00000040763347
00000059049017
00000040058314
a brtak In tha nuaarical
00000040029418
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Bank
_ Co«»trcial Chaeking
April 1 - April 30, 1996
Pagt 3 of 3
Account No. 00021042197
Balanct
InforattIon
contlnuad

Dally todgtr balanct
3.117.25
04'
3,048.27
04^25

Dallly ltdgtr balanct
04 •26
2 551.47
—
~
04/29
2,498.47

MlnlBUM balanct
Currant month aviragi ltdgtr balance
Currant aonth avtragt collactad balanct
For your
Information

Daily ltdgtr balanct
9.187.61
04^30
$ 2,498.4?
$ 7.336.60
$ 5.986.16

PLEASE RECONCILE THIS STATEMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS. WHEN INQUIRING ABOUT
TRANSACTIONS. INCLUDE A FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEflCS). ALSO. PLEASE t££ REVERSE
SIDE AND ANY ACCOMPANYING STATEMEHKS) FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION.
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440690002777
March 29, 1996

Key Organization Checking

America's neighborhood bank"

Account No. 440690002777

Page 1 of 2

^BANK
B
;ey Bank of Utah
KeyCorp Bank

Questions About Your Accounts
Call Key Express
24 hours a day, 7 days a week:
1-800-KEY2YOU (1-800-539-2988)

00069 00002 R E M B1

SUNRISE FLATS LLC
1772 WEST DOVE HOLLOW CIRCLE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84118-1492
II..I..I..I...II...III..I....II.I..II.I....I.III...II.....I.II

STATEMENT PERIOD: 03/01/96 - 03/31/96

ACCOUNT NO.: 440690002777

?$iinifnajrjBeginning balance as of 03/01/96
Plus 1 deposit(s)

9
~^^f

$457.69
1,000.00

Less 1 check(s) paid
Less service charges/fees
Ending balance as of 03/31/96

700.00
7.50
$750.19

wwiifi^^
Deposits
Posted Effective
Date
Date
03/12
03/12

Serial
Number

Description
Customer Deposit...'.
1 deposes) totaling

Amount
1,000.00
$1,000.00

-Checks:Paid ' •*• v ?3!^?$t?* indicates"ai break (hhumefical l^quence :| H-:-:?:J v ^ i ^ ^
Check No.

Date

Amount

1042....03/18

700.00

Check No.

Date

Amount

Check No.

Date

1 check(s) totaling

5

Amount
$700.00

Withdrawals and Other Charges
Service Charges
Serial
Number

Posted Effective
Date
Date
03/29
03/31

Description
Maintenance Service Charge
Service charges totaling

Amount
7.50
$7.50

Balance Summary
Date
03/12/96
03/18/96
03/29/96

Total No.
Credits
1

Total Credit
Amount

Total No.
Debits

Total Debit
Amount

1,000.00
1
1
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700.00
7.50

Balance
1,457.69
757.6?
750.'

•Q.

First
I Interstate
Bank

Salt Lak« Ci ty, UT 84101

DOVE HOLLOW I C
150 E VINE ST
HURRAY UT 841G7-4031

Page 1 of 2
R00
Account no. 21186416
Questions about your
accoun t?
CaI I our
I
Day & Night Banking CentJrat (801) 264-8020

^811074831509*

Write:
Hurray Office
1920 South State
Hurray UT 84107
BusIness Savings
April 1 - June 30, 1996
For your
Information

Watch
Your
Money
Grow

IF YOUR CURRENT SUPPLY OF FIRST INTERSTATE CHECKS IS RUNNING LOW, PLEASE
REORDER AS YOU NORMALLY WOULD. WELLS FARGO WILL CONTINUE TO PROCESS
YOUR FIRST INTERSTATE CHECKS EVEN AFTER YOUR ACCOUNTS CONVERT. CUR GOAL
IS TO HAKE THIS TRANSITION SMOOTH AND EASY FOR YOU.

Buj ii ioi::s: Sa< Ings

Account
Activity

A c c o u n t number 21186416

Number
21186416

...

Interest
earned
% P 39.'09

Annual
percentage
Vi,ld

" r2.52%
"!- d

Interest
paid
*»'»»-»•»'•
* 77.94

DOVE HOLLOW L C

B e g i n n i n g Balance
Additions (•)
06'28'96 INTEREST PAYMENT

$ 6,289.74
39.09

Subtractions (-)
Ending Balance

TRACE
* 6,328.83

**

Q

i

n

»»

First
'. Interstate
Bank ,
Business Savings
April 1 - June 30, 1996

Account
Activity
continued

Page 2 of 2
Account no: 21186416

SERVICE CHARGES
YOU DID HOT HAVF TO PAY THE $3.00 SERVICE CHARGE OH YOUR ACCOUNT THIS
PERIOD BECAUSE YOUR MINIMUM BALANCE WAS MORE THAN $100.00.
How your interest was calculated
Avg. daily collected balance
$ 6,289.74
Avg. interest rate
X
2.49962X
Days this period ( 91) C 366
X
.248633
Interest earned this period
=
$ 39.09
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/(S?

J>

' / ' / / / ?

/vx-^/

nnot tell you one thing that's going to prejudice Y£E by
valuing the estate at the time of trial.

Mr, ParkrfF has

articulated lots of ways that it will prejudice Jflm,
E COURT:

Tl lank yoi i.

Rebu\tal, Ms. Donovan?
MS. DONOVAN:

Your Honor, without belaboring the

credi bil it> i ssi le, I'Vth. \\ \ =: :• *
of testimony about how>both

g-

to he .ar a 1 ot

: the parties have handled

their financial dealings ^particularly Mr. Parker, in
trying to hide money from m$vcli#ht and that he was having
an affair with her best friend\
terms of 5iirnng\lrs. Parker, c] earl y i t
hurts Mrs. Parker if you^ion't use r^e date of divorce,
because she's relied \#on what the Com!ld.ssioner said.
si lel s i i ivested s u b s t a n t i a l a m o u n t s c »f

y i

And

. : :>perties.

Had she ever knotffi that Mr. Parker would be^ntitled to
some of that,jshe never would have done that,
so I think that, in terms of fairn^es, in
terms ajFwhat this Court previously said, we would V g u e
strenuously that the date of the divorce should be th^^ate
valuation,

And I'll submit it on that basis.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

There have bene a couple of different areas that,
counsel, you f ve covered today, and so let me address those.
And, although this motion doesn't really deal with income

<u
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specifically, income is mentioned in the course of your
memos and in your argument, so I'd like to sort that out
first.
In terms of general rules, I intend to use the
date of the divorce as the date of valuation, and that's
where I'll start.
As to whether or not these parties had a
continuing business relationship, I think that is not
applicable to how the Court divides up the property.

And

the reason that I don't think it's applicable is, it sounds
as though, from what I understand about the business
relationship, that what would happen as a result of this is
that they would both derive some income.
I don't think that, since everybody's agreed this
is not an alimony issue, I don't think it matters whether
they derived this income before the decree or after the
decree was entered.

And so, in terms of looking at their

business relationship, I'm not persuaded by that that there
ought to be a different date used.
I think, in terms of any exceptions to the rule
that I've cited, and that is the date of the divorce, those
would —

there would be two exceptions to that in which I

would consider using a different date.

One is if either

party has used a marital asset to increase the value of
something else that they have.

And that's, in particular,

30
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the home that Ms. Parker resides in.
There's an allegation that hht used mai i t a I funds
or a marital asset to increase its value after the divorce.
If I'm « nonvi need that that's true then I would vary from my
general rule and I would value it as of the date of tri^l
The second area in which I would make an
excepti on I s i f I believe, after 1 learing the evi dence, that
either party has either hidden an asset from the other
party or has tried to hide the value r\

* na*- property, then

I think I'd have - - I'd want 1: :< :> t .ake property a different value.

-r -.- -J

. ••.

~

Because, in my mind, somebody

who's going to do that is acting obstructively.

And I

think that I'd be inclined to take a look at why that
occurred and perhaps use a different valuation date.
Those: are the two _ areas in which I would be
inclined to take a look at.
particular property.

And-those would go as to any

I would not look at valuing the

entire mar ita ] estate at the date of the tria1 j I Ist because
I became convinced that one party, or both parties, tried
to hide an asset; I'd simply look at that particular asset.
This is really not part of your motion, but it's
been talked about a little bit and I guess I just need to
make my position clear.

In terms of what constitutes

marital estate, I think that it's —

there's a presumption

that the marital estate is whatever either one of these
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people acquired in interest prior to the time of the
decree.

I don't think the rule is:

If it's in my name,

it's mine and, if it's in your name, it's yours.

I think

I'd be taking a look at everything to see what part of the
marital estate is. And I just need to make that clear.
And, finally, as I pointed out before, one of the
arguments that the respondent makes is that, if we try to
freeze-frame this, we're going to run into a problem
because there would be some properties in the middle of
development.

I think that's going to occur no matter what

valuation date we use.
And it seems to me that, when parties become
divorced —

although that's not the time the Court receives

the evidence on the other issues, that's when their legal
relationship ends.

It's when parties are entitled to

believe that they can begin a new life and they're entitled
to make separate decisions with regard to assets and debts
and —

and I think they're entitled to rely on the division

of their legal entanglements, if you will, with the other
party.
So I think it's reasonable to use the general
rule, even though I acknowledge that I didn't see a case
either where the bifurcation occurred and then a trial
later.

I simply think the same underpinnings apply in

terms of reasoning.
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'A
want to —

we believe that the Court needs to clarify that

that is a marital asset that needs to be divided, and there
needs to be some requirement that Ms. Parker cooperate in
providing verification, providing an outline immediately as
to what expenses she's indicating she's going to have to
pay from that, so that we can —

so that we can have a full

understanding of what Mr. Parkerfs entitled to there.
Certainly, the receipt of those two checks, the
receipt of the $32,000 on the Kevin Gates transaction, are
all newly discovered evidence, and we do believe that there
is an error on the part of Your Honor in —

as it relates

to Murray Parkway, in trying to do other than divide the
membership of Murray Parkway, LLC, because the value of
that is so speculative, the future value is so speculative
that, as with stocks, you divide the membership.
difficult to do.

It isn't

It isn't compli-cated, as Counsel would

have the Court believe.

The membership can be divided up.

We would ask that the Court consider our motions.
And thank you for your time.
THE COURT:

Thanks, Counsel.

Let me go ahead and make some rulings on the
motions that are before the Court today.

I did have an

opportunity to read all of the memos that you supplied me
ahead of time, so I'm prepared on that.
motion for TRO and to reopen the case.

°6

Except as to the
I did not review
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that for today.

I can speak to part of it.

But, frankly,

I'm not prepared to deal with the rest of it. And so let
me handle it in this fashion.
The respondent filed a motion for TRO and to
reopen the case that was filed about the same time, I
think, that my memorandum decision went out.
were two areas that that dealt with.

And there

I can rule on one

today, and that is dealing with the properties that were
sold by the petitioner.
I don't find a basis to grant the respondent's
motion relative to the two properties that the petitioner
sold, for the same reason that I determined that properties
would be —

or, excuse me —

of the date of the divorce.

that assets would be valued as
That was dealt with either at

trial or prior to trial, and I don't recall which.

But, in

reality, there were numerous properties that each of the
parties had in their control.

And they separately made

decisions about those properties after the divorce.

They

made, for example, investment decisions or other decisions
regarding those properties and, I believe, were entitled
then to take the profit or loss, as the case may be, based
upon those individual decisions that they made following
the divorce.

They went on with their lives and handled

those properties separately and individually.
And so, for that reason, I felt that it was
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appropriate to value those properties as of the date of the
divorce•

And, for the same reason, I don't think it's

appropriate for me to revisit the issue of whether the
petitioner was entitled to keep whatever profits that she
might have made over and above the value that was
determined at the time of trial.
There were some properties, I think, that were in
a different category, and those were properties that either
weren't valued as of the date of the divorce, because there
wasn't an appraisal done on them, or because nobody really
did anything independently with those properties.

And

those were the properties that were ordered to be sold and
the proceeds divided as of the date of sale.

And so I

think those properties, of necessity, were in a different
category.

Frankly, had they all been able to be handled as

of the date of the divorce, I think that would have been
preferable.
So for that reason, I do not find a basis to
grant the respondent's motion for temporary restraining
order.

I do not recall the evidence regarding the Kevin

Gates receivable.

I can't speak to that today.

I don't

know if the ruling that I made handled that issue or
whether it did not.

What I would ask counsel to do is, if

there's a further ruling that needs to be made, please file
a notice to submit on that, and then I'll go back and
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A\r**i

review the pleadings relative to that issue.

But I'm

simply not able to do it today.
On the objection to the supplemental findings,
it's my understanding that the lis pendens issue has been
stipulated to, and I appreciate that because I wasn't able
to go back and review what we did at trial and I didn't
remember.
What I'm going to do in the supplemental findings
and other documents that I received is I'm going to line
out whatever paragraphs or sentences there are about the
lis pendens and then ask that a separate order be prepared
relative to your stipulation.

And then that can also

include the stipulation and order on the line of credit.
That does appear to be a separate stipulation that the
parties have made, and I'll .approve that and ask that that
be included.
In terms of the objection on the supplemental
findings as to the Murray Parkway issue, I'm going to deny
the respondent's objection.

My memo was not intended to be

all-inclusive of everything that I found.
to be skeletal in nature.

It was intended

That's typically what I do and I

rely on counsel to flesh out that skeletal memorandum, and
I think that's what Ms. Donovan's findings do.

So I will

include those.
And in terms of the respondent's motion for a new
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trial, I'm going to deny that also.
2

You know, I guess if I

I made some errors, I'm going to need to have an appellate

3

court tell me that I did so.

4

days, and I think that both sides had a complete and fair

5

opportunity to present whatever evidence they wanted to

6

present, and I don't find a basis, reviewing the pleadings,

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

We did try this case for five

to grant a new trial.
There are a couple of ancillary issues that have
been argued today that I'll address.
Relative to the bond monies, I will require the
petitioner to provide an accounting to the respondent as to
the bond monies that she has received.

And should any be

received by her in the future, that same order will be in
place, that she provide an accounting at the time of her
receipt and distribution of those funds.
I also find that the utility check on the Sunrise
Flats property should be divided as to its net proceeds.
What I'm going to order, however, is that that check be
made available to the plaintiff —
excuse me.

to the petitioner,

The respondent is to receive one-half of the

net proceeds, but she's entitled to have that check
initially to make whatever distribution is necessary to be
made to provide an accounting, and then, finally, to give
to him his net one-half proceeds of the amount that she's
entitled to.
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